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“We move oil all over the world. We have barrels in storage.
They are real, not just things on paper. They go on ships and
1
they go to refineries.”
INTRODUCTION
In June 2011, Coca-Cola ran out of patience . . . and aluminum. So the company filed a complaint with the London Metal
Exchange (LME), the world’s largest organized market for industrial metals, claiming that, for months, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (Goldman) had hoarded
enough commercial aluminum in its metal warehouses in De1. David Sheppard & Alexandra Alper, As Banks Deepen Commodity
Deals, Volcker Test Likely, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available at http://www
.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/us-commodities-forwards-banks-idUSBRE8620
6420120703 (quoting an anonymous Wall Street bank executive).
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troit to drive global aluminum prices to record levels. For Coca-Cola, which uses aluminum cans to package its iconic soft
drinks, this artificial delivery bottleneck at Goldman’s metal
warehouses meant an unjustified rise in operational costs and
3
potential disruptions of its production process.
On September 20, 2012, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued an order threatening to penalize
JPMorgan Ventures Energy Corp., a wholly-owned subsidiary
of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMC), for potentially misleading
the agency in its probe of the company’s allegedly manipulative
4
trade practices. The FERC began its formal investigation in
August 2011, after receiving complaints from electric power
grid operators in California and the Midwest alleging that
JPMC’s power traders had intentionally inflated wholesale
prices at which the company supplied these important regional
5
markets with electricity.
In July 2012, the Financial Times reported that JPMC,
Goldman, and Morgan Stanley had struck similarly-structured
deals, under which they would supply crude oil to several major
U.S. oil refineries and buy those refineries’ output for resale in
6
the open market. Under the terms of these deals, financiallystrapped refineries would not have to worry about any of the
logistical details of buying, storing, and transporting oil supplies or shipping their jet fuel and gasoline to customers—the
experts at JPMC, Goldman and Morgan Stanley would take
7
care of all of these operational details.
On the surface, there is nothing particularly surprising
about these seemingly unrelated snippets of recent news stories. Yet, when read together, they reveal something quite ex2. Dustin Walsh, Aluminum Bottleneck: Coke’s Complaint: 12% of Global
Stockpile Held Here, Boosting Prices, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (June 26, 2011),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110626/FREE/306269994/aluminum
-bottleneck-cokes-complaint-12-of-global-stockpile-held-here.
3. See id.
4. Kasia Klimasinska, JPMorgan Power-Trading Business Faces Suspension, FERC Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-20/jpmorgan-power-trading-business-faces
-suspension-ferc-says.html.
5. Gregory Meyer, JPMorgan in US Power Market Probe, FIN. TIMES,
July 3, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0b9acbe4-c4fc-11e1-b6fd-00144fea
bdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2eJtL04gA.
6. Gregory Meyer, Wall Street Banks Step up Oil Trade Role, FIN. TIMES,
July 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/96c4dd5e-ce70-11e1-9fa7-00144fe
abdc0.html#axzz2d1EU7Cie.
7. Id.
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traordinary and puzzling about current trends in the U.S.
banking sector—and the current state of U.S. bank regulation.
The root of the puzzlement is the fact that all three of these
institutions—Goldman, JPMC, and Morgan Stanley—are registered U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) that own or control
at least one U.S. commercial bank and, by virtue of that fact,
are subject to extensive regulation and supervision by the
8
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board).
One of the core principles underlying and shaping the elaborate
regulatory regime applicable to all U.S. banks and BHCs is the
9
principle of separation of banking and commerce. Pursuant to
that principle, U.S. commercial banks generally are not permitted to conduct any activities that do not fall within the relatively narrow band of the statutory concept of “the business of
10
banking.” Moreover, under the Bank Holding Company Act of
11
1956 (BHCA), BHCs—companies that own or control U.S.
banks—are generally restricted in their ability to engage in any
business activities other than banking or managing banks, although they may conduct a wider variety of financial activities
12
through their non-depository subsidiaries. Certain BHCs
qualifying for the status of “financial holding company” (FHC)
may conduct broader activities that are “financial in nature,”
13
including securities dealing and insurance underwriting.
This foundational structural feature of U.S. bank regulation sets it apart from the regimes found in much of the rest of
the world’s economies, where so-called “universal banking” re14
mains the prevailing model. Yet, in the last decade, large U.S.
FHCs—including Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and JPMC—
emerged as major merchants of physical commodities and energy, notwithstanding the legal wall designed to keep them out

8. Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become Holding Companies,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008, 11:50 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bank-holding-companies.
9. See Bernard Shull, Banking and Commerce in the United States, 18 J.
BANKING & FIN. 255, 267 (1994); Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking
and Commerce in the United States: An Examination of the Principal Issues, 8
FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 1, 1 (1999) [hereinafter Separation].
10. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4, 70 Stat.
133, 135–37 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1848 (2012)).
12. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1843 (2012).
13. Id. § 1843(k)(1)(A).
14. Separation, supra note 9, at 14–15.
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of any non-financial business. The implications are more than
merely doctrinal. While policy-makers are struggling with the
perplexing question of how to reduce the risks posed by the financial activities of “too-big-to-fail” banking institutions, the
latter are growing even bigger—and potentially riskier and less
manageable—by expanding their operations far beyond finance.
This Article advances two principal sets of claims. First, as
a matter of doctrinal integrity, it argues that the quiet transformation of U.S. FHCs into global merchants of physical commodities effectively nullifies the foundational principle of separation of banking from commerce. The Article puts together the
first comprehensive account to date of what is publicly known
about the nature and scope of U.S. banking organizations’
physical commodities activities and examines the existing legal
and regulatory framework for conducting such activities. It argues that the BHCA does not provide a sufficiently robust
structure for the regulation and supervision of FHCs’ extensive
commercial operations in global commodity and energy markets. Statutory authorizations of FHCs’ merchant banking operations, activities “complementary” to a financial activity, and
grandfathered commodities businesses fail to establish meaningful limitations on the expansion of their physical commodi16
ties operations in practice.
Second, as a normative matter, the Article argues that
FHCs’ physical commodities activities raise potentially serious
public policy concerns that may be divided into two closely related categories. To begin with, these activities threaten to undermine the fundamental policy objectives that underlie the
principle of separating banking from commerce: ensuring the
safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system, maintaining
a fair and efficient flow of credit in the economy, protecting
market integrity, and preventing excessive concentration of
economic power. As the Article shows, all of these traditional
concerns assume a new, heightened significance in the context
of banks’ involvement in the trading of physical commodities
17
and energy. The need to prevent potentially excessive accumulations of both risk exposure and market power in the hands
of a few large FHCs is paramount in this respect. When the
same banking organizations that control access to money and
credit also control access to such universal production inputs as
15. See supra notes 2–5.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
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raw materials and energy, they are in a position to exercise
disproportionate control over the entire economic—and, by extension, political—system. In this context, it is important to
remind ourselves of Justice Brandeis’s famous warnings
against the threat to American democracy posed by financial
institutions accumulating direct control over the country’s in18
dustrial enterprises. Brandeis’s words ring as alarmingly true
today as they did nearly a hundred years ago. If there are good
reasons to believe that extreme power breeds extreme abuses,
the ongoing expansion of large FHCs into physical commodities
and energy business warrants serious concern.
Beyond the traditional normative justifications for separating banking from commerce, the Article argues that FHCs’ expansion into physical commodities implicates a distinct set of
policy concerns relating to potential new sources and transmission channels of systemic risk, the integrity and efficacy of the
regulatory process, and the governability of financial markets
and institutions. Understanding FHCs’ roles as energy and
commodity merchants challenges our current notions of how
systemic risk originates and spreads throughout the economy
and puts into a broader substantive context the search for more
19
effective mechanisms of systemic risk containment. When financial institutions act as traders and dealers in physical
commodities, they assume a variety of new financial and nonfinancial risks—including operational, environmental, and geopolitical risks—that fundamentally alter their business and
risk profiles. In addition to risks inherent in their traditional
business of providing financial services, these institutions become directly dependent on the operation of the multitude of
factors shaping the costs of doing business in each individual
20
commodity market. Given the high degree of interconnected18. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 3–5 (1933).
19. Systemic risk can be defined as:
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of
a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital
or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
20. See Commodities-Oil, Gold Slide but Post Big Monthly Gains,
REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/
30/markets-commodities-idUSL2N0GV1O520130830 (discussing different
commodities’ price shifts). Markets for different commodities—oil, natural gas,
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ness among financial institutions, this new source of vulnerability creates new, more complex patterns of systemic fragility
21
and risk contagion. It also makes these emerging financialindustrial conglomerates nearly impossible to manage, regulate, and supervise in accordance with the micro- and macroprudential policy objectives of post-crisis financial services regulation.
By identifying and analyzing these issues, the Article aims
to contribute to both the long-standing academic debate on the
efficacy and desirability of separating banking from commerce,
on the one hand, and to the growing scholarly literature on the
nature and regulation of systemic risk in financial markets, on
the other. The policy implications of the analysis, moreover,
reach beyond the realm of U.S. banking law and its foundational principles. Many of the same public policy concerns that
arise with respect to banking organizations’ commodity trading—heightened potential for conflicts of interest and market
manipulation, an excessive concentration of market power, increased systemic risk from direct linkages between financial
markets and economically vital commodities markets, and lessened governability of financial institutions—are also implicated
when non-bank systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) engage in such activities. This in turn raises broader
theoretical questions concerning the very nature and social
function of modern financial intermediation. Is it in the public
interest to allow financial intermediaries in general—and SIFIs
in particular—to engage in commercial business activities related to physical commodities and energy trading, a critically
important sphere of economic activity? Or does the mixing of
finance—as opposed to just banking—with this particular form
of commerce create unique risks from the perspective of systemic stability and the integrity and efficiency of today’s interconnected markets? While a full consideration of these issues is
beyond the scope of the present Article, a factually-grounded

coal, electricity, and various precious and base metals—display different characteristics in terms of market structure and dynamics, the relative salience of
various economic and political factors in determining prices and costs of doing
business, and the applicable regulatory scheme. See id. (discussing different
commodities’ price shifts). The nature of the commodity—its physical characteristics, economic uses, and geographic concentration—accounts for many of
these differences. Id. This diversity of commodity markets further complicates
the task of effective systemic oversight of FHCs’ role in them.
21. Id.

272

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:265

examination of U.S. banking organizations’ role in commodity
markets lays a conceptual foundation for future deliberation.
There is a particular urgency to focusing upon that role
now, as Goldman and Morgan Stanley, which converted to BHC
22
status at the height of the financial crisis in September 2008,
are at the end of the five-year grace period during which they
had to either divest their impermissible commercial businesses
23
or find legal authority under the BHCA for keeping them. In
the fall of 2013, the Board has to determine whether these
firms may continue their existing commodities operations and,
24
if so, under what conditions. Both firms have been reportedly
lobbying the Board to allow them to keep their existing physi25
cal commodities assets and operations. Given its potential
significance, this issue should not be left to behind-the-scene
negotiations between the banks and their regulators. By drawing attention to this problem, this Article aims to reclaim the
public’s right to participate in important public policy decisions.
Reaching beyond the impending Board ruling, however, the
Article calls for a thorough reconsideration of the entire legal
and regulatory framework for large financial institutions’ activities in physical commodity markets. Whether Goldman and
Morgan Stanley expand or contract their existing commodity
investments is only one aspect of the broader and far more critical inquiry into the proper legal boundaries for financial intermediaries’ direct involvement in commodities trade and production. Even if individual firms were to scale down their
physical commodities operations in the near future, either in
response to post-crisis market trends or as a result of regulatory action, it would not obviate the need to reassess the fundamental norms and principles underlying the current system of
financial services regulation.
Despite both its immediate urgency and its broader doctrinal, policy, and conceptual significance, this topic has been
26
largely ignored to date. In part, this lack of scholarly attention
22. Schroeder, supra note 8.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See David Sheppard et al., Wall Street, Fed Face Off Over Commodities, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
03/02/us-fed-banks-commodities-idUSTRE8211CC20120302.
26. In recent years, the academic and policy discussions of the doctrine of
separation of banking from commerce focused mainly on issues posed by the
attempts of commercial companies—most notably, Wal-Mart Stores Inc.—to
develop banking capabilities. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Sepa-
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and analysis may be explained by what appears to be the deliberately obscure nature of banking organizations’ commodity operations and lack—or extreme inadequacy—of publicly available information on the structure and scope of such operations.
It is virtually impossible to glean even a broad overall picture
of Goldman’s, Morgan Stanley’s, or JPMC’s physical commodities activities from their public filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal bank regulators. Although this Article cannot fill that informational gap, it takes
the first step toward that goal by analyzing and synthesizing
publicly available information on the subject and identifying
the key areas in which further inquiry and deliberation are
called for.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I describes the
normative basis for the separation of banking and commerce in
the U.S. and outlines the key legal and regulatory conditions
under which FHCs may conduct commercial activities. Part II
analyzes the process and consequences of regulatory expansion,
between 2000 and 2008, of FHCs’ authority to engage in physical commodity trading as an activity “complementary” to financial activities. Part III examines key changes in the nature and
scope of physical commodities activities on the part of U.S.
banking organizations in the wake of the recent financial crisis.
Part IV discusses legal, normative, and theoretical implications
of these phenomena for the ongoing process of financial regulation reform.
I. WHAT WE SAY: THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND
COMMERCE
The separation of banking and commerce is one of the fundamental principles underlying the U.S. system of bank regula27
tion. State and federal banking statutes impose a complex
web of restrictions and prohibitions on the business activities
and investments of U.S. commercial banks and their affili28
ates. This Part describes the doctrine and its policy rationales
ration of Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 385, 385 (2012) (arguing that if companies like Wal-Mart owned banks, the financial structure
would be more diverse and less risk-prone); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart
and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1539
(2007) (discussing Wal-Mart’s attempt to acquire FDIC-insured industrial loan
companies).
27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28. See Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a
Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the
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and analyzes the three principal sources of FHCs’ legal authority to conduct purely commercial activities.
A. POLICY REASONS FOR SEPARATING BANKING FROM GENERAL
COMMERCE
Historically, banks in the United States have been granted
charters with only limited powers. The National Bank Act of
1863 grants federally-chartered, or national, banks:
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes,
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning
money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating
29
notes.

In the last three decades, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the principal regulator of national banks, has
consistently interpreted the statutory language in a manner
that has significantly expanded the outer boundaries of the
30
“business of banking.” Nevertheless, commercial banks re31
main subject to restrictive balance sheet regulation and are
32
generally prohibited from engaging in non-banking activities.
In addition to the statutory grants of only limited powers
to banks, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks from
participating in the securities dealing and underwriting busi33
ness and from affiliating with securities firms. The GlassSteagall Act, however, did not preclude banks from affiliating
with firms engaged in purely commercial activities. Only since
the enactment of the BHCA in 1956, have companies that own
34
or control U.S. banks —BHCs—been subject to a separate set
35
of legal restrictions on their business activities. The BHCA is
United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 118–21 (2011).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
30. See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives
Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1077 (2009).
31. See Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, Finance: Balance Sheet Battle, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b42fd1f6-ff7e
-11e2-a244-00144feab7de.html#axzz2eJtL04gA.
32. Omarova, supra note 30, at 1050.
33. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 184–85 (1933)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2012). Although the definition of “control” for
purposes of determining whether an entity is a BHC is complicated and factdependent, the statute generally presumes the existence of “control” where an
entity owns more than twenty-five percent of any class of voting shares of a
bank. Id. § 1841(a)(2)(A).
35. Id. §§ 1841–1843.
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the federal statute that most explicitly operationalizes the
principle of separation of banking and commerce. It does so by
restricting the permissible activities and investments of BHCs
to banking, managing or owning banks, and a limited set of ac36
tivities determined to be “closely related to banking.” BHCs
are required to register with, and become subject to an extensive regime of consolidated regulation and supervision by, the
37
Board. Thus, BHCs submit mandatory periodic reports to the
Board, which has direct examination and enforcement authori38
ty over them. They are subject to capital adequacy regulation
and must serve as a “source of strength” to their bank subsidi39
aries. Yet, it is the loss of legal authority to own a significant
ownership stake in non-financial—and even many non-banking
financial businesses—that is often viewed as the most severe
consequence faced by any company that acquires a U.S. bank
40
and thereby becomes a BHC.
In effect, the entire system of U.S. bank and BHC regulation is designed to keep institutions that are engaged in deposit-taking and commercial lending activities from conducting, directly or through some business combination, any significant
non-financial activities, or from holding significant interests in
any general commercial enterprise. The main arguments in favor of maintaining this legal wall between the “business of
banking” and purely commercial business activities have traditionally included the needs to preserve the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, to ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to productive economic enterprise, and to
prevent excessive concentration of financial and economic pow41
er in the financial sector.
The safety and soundness argument generally posits that
exposing federally insured depository institutions to the risks
associated with manufacturing and commercial activities increases the vulnerability of the banking and payments systems,
the federal deposit insurance fund, and thereby the broader
36. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
37. Id. § 1844(a), (b).
38. Id. § 1844(c).
39. Adam Ashcraft, Are Bank Holding Companies a Source of Strength to
Their Banking Subsidiaries?, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 273, 273–74
(2008).
40. Schroeder, supra note 8 (suggesting Federal oversight is the biggest
negative to becoming a BHC).
41. Separation, supra note 9, at 29–30, 46–47, 52 (discussing policy arguments of maintaining a wall between banking and commerce).
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economy. To the extent that this argument relies on an assumption that all commercial activities are inherently more
risky and volatile than purely financial activities, it may not be
particularly convincing. There are also potential diversification
benefits that may support allowing banks to invest, at least to
some extent, in commercial enterprises. At the same time,
however, some commercial activities may pose greater risks or
require more specialized and expensive risk management and
monitoring than others. Allowing banks to conduct such activities may therefore increase the exposure of the federal deposit
insurance system to the ups and downs of unrelated commercial markets.
The need to ensure an impartial and efficient allocation of
credit throughout the national economy provides another compelling justification for disallowing the mixing of banking and
commerce. Traditionally, one of the key policy concerns in this
area has been the prevention of potential conflicts of interest.
Affiliation with commercial companies may create powerful incentives for banks to make important lending decisions on the
basis of such decisions’ potential impact on their commercial affiliates’ financial condition or profitability. Price discrimination,
unfair restriction of access to credit, and other anti-competitive
banking practices may not only hurt the individual commercial
companies not affiliated with banks, but also significantly undermine a nation’s economic productivity and growth. To date,
empirical research has not produced definitive evidence either
to support or to defeat this argument. As a plausible prudential
policy concern, however, it remains an important factor.
Perhaps the most compelling policy reason for institutionalizing the separation of banking from commerce, especially
through regulatory restrictions on BHCs’ activities, is the prevention of excessive concentration of economic—and ultimately
political—power in the hands of large financial-industrial conglomerates. In fact, the BHCA was originally designed princi42
pally as an antitrust, anti-monopoly law. According to the author of the leading treatise on the subject:
Bank holding company regulation in the United States historically
has had two overriding goals: to prevent the unrestrained concentration of banking resources under the control of a single organization,
and to prevent undue concentration of economic power that Congress
perceived may result when banking and nonbanking enterprises com-

42. Note, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 9 STAN. L. REV. 333,
346 (1957).
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43

This explicitly anti-monopoly policy focus of the BHCA has
its roots in the long-standing American tradition of mistrust of
“big business” and “high finance,” along with a corresponding
preference for small, local business enterprise as a unit of eco44
nomic activity. The very enactment of the BHCA was in significant measure the product of successful political lobbying by
small independent and community banks, trying to protect
their local markets from potential competition from large out45
of-state banks. In recent decades, however, the political economy of the U.S. financial services sector has changed dramatically, as a small number of large, internationally active financial conglomerates have become dominant economic and
46
political actors in the industry. As part of this process, the
original antitrust thrust of U.S. bank holding company regula47
tion has faded in significance and come to be largely forgotten.
Yet, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, which exposed
the potential systemic dangers of allowing unchecked growth of
“too-big-to-fail” conglomerates, there is a strong argument for
reviving and strengthening the policy of preventing excessive
concentration of economic and political power in the financial
services sector. From this perspective, it becomes particularly
important to revisit the basis for, and the role of, the principle
of separation of banking and commerce.
It should be noted, however, that in practice the relationship between banking and commerce in the United States has
long followed a non-linear and complex pattern, as the legal
wall separating them has never been completely impenetra48
ble. Numerous exemptions from the general statutory restrictions on affiliations, such as the exemption for unitary
49
thrift holding companies or companies controlling certain
43. MELANIE FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 7.02[1], at
7-4 (3d ed. 2013).
44. See MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 98–99 (1994).
45. For a discussion of the origins and history of the BHCA, see generally
Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 113.
46. Id. at 124.
47. Id. at 123–24.
48. See Joseph G. Haubrich & João A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of
Mixing Banking with Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN.
MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 121, 122 (2003) (arguing that “banking and commerce in the United States has a convoluted and obscure history”).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3) (2012).
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50

state-chartered industrial banks, historically have allowed a
wide variety of commercial firms to own and operate deposit51
taking institutions. Banks and BHCs, in turn, have always
been allowed at least some degree of involvement in nonfinancial activities, even if subject to various statutory and
regulatory conditions and limitations. Not surprisingly, against
that backdrop, the efficacy and desirability of the separation of
banking and commerce as the principal method of achieving its
stated policy goals—protecting the safety and soundness of the
depository system, ensuring an impartial and efficient allocation of credit, and preventing an excessive concentration of eco52
nomic power—continue to be subjects of intense debates.
B. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY EFFECT: PARTIAL MIXING OF
BANKING AND COMMERCE
In recent decades, fundamental changes in the nature and
scope of financial intermediation have made the continuing relevance of the separation of banking and commerce particularly
salient. Beginning in the late 1970s, U.S. banks came under increasing pressure to move away from the traditional spreaddriven banking business model, in response to the so-called
53
process of “disintermediation.” As more lightly regulated investment banks began offering new products and services that
competed with traditional banking products, banks sought to
54
regain their profitability by expanding into capital markets.
Technologically driven processes of financial innovation and
globalization enabled financial institutions to continuously ex-

50. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H).
51. General Electric is perhaps the best-known example of a unitary thrift
holding company that combines industrial operations with a successful financial business run through its subsidiary, GE Capital. See Paul Glader, Is GE
Capital Another CIT Waiting to Happen?, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. BLOG (July 17,
2009, 10:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/07/17/tale-of-the-tape-cit-v
-general-electric.
52. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 73–75 (1995); John R. Walter,
Banking and Commerce: Tear Down This Wall?, ECON. Q., Spring 2003, http://
www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2003/spring/
walter.cfm.
53. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 125.
54. See Valentine V. Craig, Merchant Banking: Past and Present, FDIC
BANKING REV. 29, 32–33 (2002) (discussing the evolution of banks’ capital investments).
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55

pand their activities and sources of revenues.
In this context, the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited
BHCs from conducting lucrative securities trading and dealing
activities, became the primary target of the banking industry’s
56
deregulatory campaign. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the
industry’s lobbying efforts led to significant piecemeal erosion
57
of the Glass-Steagall regime by regulatory action. During that
period, the Board consistently relaxed statutory activity limitations on BHCs, most notably by interpreting the Glass-Steagall
Act to permit so-called “Section 20” subsidiaries of BHCs to underwrite securities, as long as these activities generated no
58
more than five percent of such subsidiaries’ revenues. By
1996, the Board increased the revenue ceiling to twenty-five
percent, thus allowing many BHCs to acquire regional invest59
ment banking firms.
At the same time, the OCC engaged in parallel efforts to
relax statutory restrictions on commercial banks’ activities, by
ever more broadly interpreting the statutory term “business of
60
banking.” Perhaps most importantly, the OCC’s interpretations allowed U.S. banks to engage in an increasingly broad
range of new derivatives activities, including trading and deal61
ing in derivatives instruments linked to various commodities.
Finally, Congress partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act
62
in enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the GLBA).
The GLBA amended the BHCA to allow commercial banks and
securities firms to affiliate under a newly-created FHC struc63
ture. Specifically, the main operative provision of section 4(k)
of the BHCA, added by the GLBA, states that an FHC:
55. Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, Financial Innovation, and “Too Big to Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 529–30
(2012).
56. Id. at 518–19 (discussing the demise of the Glass-Steagall Act).
57. Id.
58. See FEIN, supra note 43, § 18-06[4], at 18-27 to 18-29.
59. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 764 (4th ed. 2011).
60. See Omarova, supra note 30, at 1077.
61. Id.
62. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801–6809 (2012)).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2012). To become an FHC, a BHC has to meet
a list of statutory criteria, the most important of which requires that the BHC
itself and all of its deposit-taking subsidiaries are well-capitalized and wellmanaged. Id.
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may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares of
any company engaged in any activity, that the Board . . . determines
(by regulation or order)—
(A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or
(B) is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or
64
the financial system generally.

The main goal of the new regime was to allow an expansion
of financial activities of banking organizations through organizational affiliations. To make these business combinations viable as a practical matter, the statute also authorized FHCs to
conduct certain non-financial activities impermissible for mere
65
BHCs not qualifying for that new regulatory status. Generally, however, an FHC may acquire shares of any entity engaged,
either exclusively or partly, in non-financial activities, only
pursuant to a specific grant of statutory authority.
Three principal provisions of the GLBA enable FHCs to
engage in commercial activities on a much broader scale than
before. First, an FHC may make passive private equity investments of any size in any commercial company under the so66
called “merchant banking” authority. Second, an FHC may directly engage in purely commercial activities determined to be
67
“complementary” to a financial activity. Finally, Congress also
provided a special grandfathering provision for commodity activities of certain entities that become subject to the BHCA af68
ter the GLBA enactment. Thus, while directly targeting the
Glass-Steagall separation between commercial and investment
banking, the GLBA also significantly undermined the broaderreaching wall separating banking from commerce.
64. Id.
65. Unlike commercial banks, U.S. securities firms were not subject to
prohibitions or restrictions on their business activities and were generally free
to engage in any commercial activity. If forced to divest all of their pre-GLBA
non-financial investments and assets, investment banks were unlikely to
agree to any business combination with a BHC.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(7).
67. Id. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 1843(o). The GLBA also added a separate section grandfathering
a broader swath of non-financial activities of the entities that became subject
to the BHCA (and elect the FHC status) after November 12, 1999. Id.
§ 1843(n). A special sunset provision, however, required an FHC to terminate
any such grandfathered commercial activities no later than November 12,
2009, unless the Board extended the divestiture date for such an FHC for up
to an additional five years (until November 12, 2014). Id. § 1843(n)(7). This
statutory provision has little practical significance in the context of Goldman’s
and Morgan Stanley’s current efforts to retain their commodity assets.
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1. Financing Commerce: Merchant Banking Powers
Prior to the enactment of the GLBA, a BHC was generally
permitted to make passive private equity investments in any
commercial company only if such investments did not exceed,
69
in each case, five percent of such company’s voting securities.
The relatively low percentage ceiling on such permissible investments was designed primarily to ensure that BHCs did not
acquire control of commercial entities and remained strictly
70
passive investors in any such entities. The GLBA greatly expanded the ability of certain qualifying BHCs—namely, those
registering under the newly created category of FHCs—to make
passive equity investments by granting FHCs so-called mer71
chant banking powers.
The merchant banking authority permits an FHC to acquire or control, directly or indirectly, up to 100% of any kind of
ownership interest—including equity or debt securities, partnership interests, trust certificates, warrants, options, or any
other instruments evidencing ownership—in any entity that
engages in purely commercial, as opposed to financial, activi72
ties. By creating this new investment authority, the GLBA
enabled FHCs to conduct a broad range of securities underwriting, investment banking, and merchant banking activities, subject to statutory conditions and limitations. Most importantly,
at the height of the high-tech stock boom, the GLBA’s grant of
merchant banking powers allowed FHCs to compete with securities firms and venture-capital funds by investing in technolo73
gy start-ups.
Historically rooted in the European tradition of trade finance, by the late 1990s, merchant banking denoted various
forms of private equity investments, including leveraged buy74
outs and venture-capital funding of start-up companies. Interestingly, however, the statute does not define the term “merchant banking.” In 2001, the Board and the Department of
Treasury jointly issued a final rule implementing section
75
4(k)(4)(H) of the BHCA (the Merchant Banking Rule). The
69. Id. § 1843(c)(6)–(7).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 225.137 (2013).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H), (7).
72. Id. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
73. Craig, supra note 54, at 33.
74. See id. at 29–30.
75. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg.
8,466, 8,484–85 (Jan. 31, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.170 (2013)).
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Merchant Banking Rule defines “merchant banking” activities
and investments as those activities and investments that are
76
not otherwise authorized under section 4 of the BHCA. In effect, the merchant banking power serves as a catch-all authority for FHCs to invest in commercial enterprises, as long as any
77
such investment meets the following five requirements :
(1) the investment is not made or held, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. depository institution (such as a bank subsidiary
78
of the FHC);
(2) the investment is made “as part of a bona fide underwriting or merchant or investment banking activity,” which includes investments made “for the purpose of appreciation and
79
ultimate resale”;
(3) the FHC either (i) is or has a securities broker-dealer
affiliate, or (ii) has both (A) an insurance company affiliate that
is predominantly engaged in underwriting life, accident and
health, or property and casualty insurance (other than creditrelated insurance), or providing and issuing annuities and (B) a
registered investment adviser affiliate that provides invest80
ment advice to an insurance company;
(4) the investment is held “only for a period of time to enable the sale or disposition thereof on a reasonable basis consistent with the financial viability of the FHC’s merchant bank81
ing investment activities”; and
(5) the FHC does not “routinely manage or operate” any
portfolio company in which it made the investment, except as
76. 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a) (2013). The Merchant Banking Rule provides
the following definition:
Section 4(k)(4)(H) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)) and this subpart authorize a financial holding company, directly or indirectly and as principal or on behalf of one or
more persons, to acquire or control any amount of shares, assets or
ownership interests of a company or other entity that is engaged in
any activity not otherwise authorized for the financial holding company under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act. For purposes
of this subpart, shares, assets or ownership interests acquired or controlled under section 4(k)(4)(H) and this subpart are referred to as
“merchant banking investments.”
Id.
77. Id.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(i) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(d).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(b).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f). The merchant
banking investment need not be held by or through the securities or insurance
affiliates of the FHC. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(a).
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may be necessary in order to obtain a reasonable return on in82
vestment upon resale or disposition.
The requirement that a permissible merchant banking investment be made as part of a bona fide underwriting or investment banking activity imposes an important functional
limitation on merchant banking activities. Even though an
FHC is permitted to acquire full ownership of a purely commercial firm, the principal purpose of its investment must remain
purely financial: making a profit upon subsequent resale or
83
disposition of its ownership stake. The Board made clear that
merchant banking authority was not designed to allow FHCs to
enter the nonfinancial business conducted by any portfolio
84
company. This explicitly stated statutory requirement “preserves the financial nature of merchant banking investment activities and helps further the . . . purpose of maintaining the
85
separation of banking and commerce.”
Another important requirement that shapes the practical
usefulness of the merchant banking authority to FHCs investing in commercial companies is the holding period for merchant
banking investments, which is generally limited to a maximum
86
of ten years. If the investment is made through a qualifying
87
private equity fund, the maximum holding period is fifteen
88
years. In certain exigent circumstances, the FHC may petition
the Board to allow it to hold the investment for some limited
89
time in excess of the applicable holding period. Explicit limits
on the duration of merchant banking investments underscore
the principally financial nature of this activity.
Finally, the prohibition on FHCs’ involvement in the routine management and operation of portfolio companies they
own or control under the merchant banking authority is designed to serve as an additional safeguard against mixing
banking and commerce. The Merchant Banking Rule lists the
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(a).
83. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg.
8,466, 8,469 (Jan. 31, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2013)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(1).
87. Id. § 225.173(a)(1)–(5).
88. Id. § 225.173(c)(1).
89. Id. § 225.172(b)(4). These extensions are meant to apply in situations
where unfavorable market conditions or other circumstances would make it
necessary or economically prudent for an FHC to temporarily postpone the resale or disposition of the investment. See id. § 225.172(b)(5).
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indicia of impermissible routine management or operation of a
portfolio company, which include certain kinds of management
90
interlocking and contractual restrictions on the portfolio company’s ability to make routine business decisions, such as hiring non-executive officers or employees, or entering into trans91
actions in the ordinary course of business. Arrangements that
do not constitute routine management or operation of a portfolio company include contractual agreements restricting the
portfolio company’s ability to take actions not in the ordinary
92
course of business; providing financial, investment, and management consulting advice to, and underwriting securities of,
93
the portfolio company; and meeting with the company’s employees to monitor or advise them in connection with the portfo94
lio company’s performance or activities. Importantly, the Merchant Banking Rule specifically allows an FHC to elect any or
all of the directors of any portfolio company, as long as the
board of directors does not participate in the routine manage95
ment or operation of the portfolio company.
90. Id. § 225.171(a), (b)(1). An FHC is deemed to be engaged in the routine
management or operation of a portfolio company if (1) any director, officer, or
employee of the FHC or certain of its subsidiaries (including depository institutions, securities broker-dealers, and merchant banking subsidiaries) serves
as, or has the responsibilities of, an executive officer of a portfolio company; or
(2) any executive officer of the FHC or any of the same subsidiaries as mentioned above serves as, or has the responsibilities of, an officer or employee of
the portfolio company. Id. § 225.171(b)(1).
An FHC is presumed to be routinely managing or operating a portfolio
company if:
(i) any director, officer, or employee of the [FHC] serves as or has the
responsibilities of [a non-executive officer] or employee of the portfolio
company; or (ii) [a]ny officer or employee of the portfolio company is
supervised by any director, officer, or employee of the [FHC] (other
than in that individual’s capacity as a director of the portfolio company).
Id. § 225.171(b)(2). An FHC may rebut these presumptions by providing the
Board with sufficient information showing the absence of routine management
or operation. Id. § 225.171(c).
91. Id. § 225.171(b)(1).
92. Id. § 225.171(d)(2).
93. Id. § 225.171(d)(3)(i), (ii).
94. Id. § 225.171(d)(3)(iii).
95. Id. § 225.171(d)(1). The portfolio company must employ officers and
employees responsible for routinely managing and operating its affairs. Id.
§ 225.171(d)(1)(i). An FHC may engage, on a temporary basis, in the routine
management or operation of a portfolio company only if such actions are necessary to save the economic value of the FHC’s investment and to obtain a
reasonable return on such investment upon its resale or disposition. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(1).
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Despite their seemingly harsh tenor, these restrictions
leave FHCs considerable flexibility in directing the affairs of
their portfolio companies. The indicia of “routine management”
focus mainly on specific personnel decisions and formalized arrangements ceding control over ordinary-course business decisions. Avoiding such formal indicia of “routinely managing” a
portfolio company’s daily affairs, while retaining control over
important substantive aspects of its business, presents little
96
difficulty. The real question is whether, in practice, FHCs
comply with the formal requirements of the Merchant Banking
Rule while circumventing its intended purpose by using merchant banking authority not to make purely financial investments in commercial companies but primarily as a means of
97
engaging in impermissible commercial activities.
2. Pure Commerce: “Complementary” Powers
As discussed above, the main justification for allowing
FHCs to own or control commercial companies under the merchant banking authority is the notion of merchant banking as a
fundamentally financial activity. However, the GLBA also contains a separate grant of authority for FHCs to conduct activities that are clearly not financial in nature but are determined
98
by the Board to be “complementary” to a financial activity.
The statute requires that the Board also determine that any
such complementary activity “not pose a substantial risk to the
safety or soundness of depository institutions or the financial
99
system generally.”
Procedurally, the Board makes these determinations on a
case-by-case basis. Any FHC seeking to acquire more than five
percent of the voting securities of any class of a company engaged in any commercial activity that the FHC believes to be
complementary to a financial activity must apply for the
100
Board’s prior approval by filing a written notice. In the no96. Similarly, the holding period limitation may not be a deal-breaker for
an FHC seeking commercial investments: ten years can be a long time horizon
in today’s financial markets.
97. This is an empirical question that requires a qualitative analysis of
individual FHC’s use of merchant banking authority and the nature of its relationship with portfolio companies. It is not clear whether the Board currently collects such data.
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
99. Id.
100. 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a) (2013). The FHC applies for approval by filing at
least a sixty-day prior notice in accordance with section 4(j) of the BHCA. 12
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tice, the FHC must specifically describe the proposed commercial activity; identify the financial activity for which it would be
complementary and provide detailed information sufficient to
support a finding of “complementarity”; describe the scope and
relative size of the proposed activity (as measured by the expected percentages of revenues and assets associated with the
proposed activity); and discuss the risks the proposed commercial activity “may reasonably be expected” to pose to the safety
and soundness of the FHC’s deposit-taking subsidiaries along
with the risk management measures the FHC would take to
101
minimize such risks.
The notice must also describe the public benefits that engaging in the proposed activity “reasonably can be expected to
102
produce.” In making its determination, the Board is required
to make a specific finding that the proposed activity would produce public benefits that outweigh its potential adverse ef103
fects.
The statutory list of such public benefits includes
“greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in effi104
ciency.” The Board must balance these benefits against such
dangers as “undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices, or risk to the stability of the United States banking or fi105
nancial system.”
The legislative history of this provision shows that the industry deliberately sought the inclusion of the “complementary”
clause as an open-ended source of legal authority for banking
organizations to engage in any commercial activities that may
become feasible or potentially profitable in the future. In congressional hearings, financial services industry representatives
stressed “the importance of having the flexibility to engage in
nominally commercial activities, particularly those related to
technology and telecommunications, that support and comple106
ment [their] core business.” This is how then Vice-Chairman
U.S.C. § 1843(j)(4)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a).
101. 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a)(1)–(5).
102. Id. § 225.89(a)(6).
103. Id. § 225.89(b)(3).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A).
105. Id. This list essentially reiterates the policy concerns underlying the
principle of separation of banking from commerce. See supra Part I.A.
106. The Financial Services Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 172 (1998) (prepared statement of John G. Heimann, Chairman, Global Financial Institutions, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., on behalf of the Financial Services Council).
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of J.P. Morgan & Co. described the industry’s vision of “complementary” business activities:
The world of finance has changed. Information services and technological delivery systems have become an integral part of the financial services business. Financial firms use overcapacity in their back
office operations by offering services to others such as telephone help
lines or data processing for commercial firms. These activities may
not be strictly “financial,” yet they utilize a financial firm’s resources
and complement its financial capabilities in a manner that is beneficial to the firm without adverse policy implications.
Financial firms also engage in activities that arguably might be
considered non-financial, but which enhance their ability to sell financial products. One example is American Express, which publishes
magazines of interest to its cardholders—Food & Wine and Travel &
Leisure. Travel & Leisure magazine is complementary to the travel
business (an activity permitted within the definition of financial in
H.R. 10) in that it gives customers travel ideas which the company
hopes will lead to ticket purchases and other travel arrangements
through American Express Travel Services. Similarly, Food & Wine
promotes dining out, as well as purchases of food and wine, all of
which might lead to greater use of the American Express Card. These
activities are complementary to financial business and thus should be
107
permissible for financial holding companies.

The industry’s frequent references to Travel & Leisure and
Food & Wine magazines effectively framed the congressional
debate on “complementary” activities as a debate about relatively low-risk, low-profile activities, such as publishing and financial data dissemination. In reality, however, the possibility
of having a flexible, undefined statutory category of permissible
commercial activities was especially attractive to financial institutions seeking to take advantage of the dot-com boom and
108
potentially expand into far riskier Internet ventures. From
the industry’s perspective, an intentionally open-ended “com109
plementary” authority was the key to such an expansion.
107. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 10
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 294–95 (1999)
(prepared testimony of Michael E. Patterson, Vice Chairman, J.P. Morgan &
Co., Inc., on behalf of the Financial Services Council).
108. As the CEO of Bank One Corp. put it, “[t]he area on the commerce
side that is most interesting to me is what is happening on the Internet.” The
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the
H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 18 (1999) (testimony of
John B. McCoy, President and CEO, Bank One Corporation).
109. Straying from the magazine-publishing story line, Chairman and CEO
of Merrill Lynch explained the industry’s need for definitional flexibility as
follows:
[O]ne of our concerns was . . . to retain the ability to make investments in Silicon Valley for research and development and for access
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In April 1999, the Senate introduced its version of the reform bill that for the first time included the “complementary
110
powers” provision. In June 1999, the House bill was amended
to incorporate a similar authorization of “complementary” activities but only “to the extent that the amount of such complementary activities remains small in relation to the author111
ized activities to which they are complementary.”
This
express limitation disappeared from the final version enacted
into law as part of the GLBA, leaving the Board free to set its
own conditions for FHCs’ complementary activities.
The Board has described the intended scope and purpose of
its own authority to approve certain activities as complementary to an FHC’s financial activity in relatively cautious terms,
as allowing individual FHCs to do the following:
[T]o engage, to a limited extent, in activities that appear to be commercial if a meaningful connection exists between the proposed commercial activity and the FHC’s financial activities and the proposed
commercial activity would not pose undue risks to the safety and
soundness of the FHC’s affiliated depository institutions or the finan112
cial system.

Curiously, between 2000 and 2012, the Board used its authority almost exclusively to approve physical commodity and
energy trading activities as complementary to FHCs’ financial
113
activity of trading in commodity derivatives. It seems that,
to systems and technology. If we had had this conversation three to
five years ago, this would have been the furthest thing from our
minds and something we certainly at that time would not been involved in nor had very much interest in being involved in.
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before
the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 23–24 (1999) (testimony of David Komansky, Chairman and CEO, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.).
110. S. 900, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999) (as placed on the Senate calendar,
Apr. 28, 1999). The Democratic members of the Senate’s Banking Committee
unanimously voted against the bill as significantly weakening the separation
of banking and commerce. S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 54, 73 (1999). They specifically criticized the Republican majority’s new “complementary” clause as too
open-ended and unnecessary. Id. at 75.
111. H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999) (as reported by H. Comm. on Banking & Financial Services, June 15, 1999) (internal citations omitted). An earlier House Committee Report included a similar provision. See H.R. REP. NO.
106-74, pt. 1, at 5 (1999).
112. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,493 (Dec. 9, 2003) (emphasis added).
113. See infra Part II.B. It appears that, as of mid-2013, the Board approved only one other type of activity—certain disease management and mailorder pharmacy services—as complementary to a financial activity of underwriting and selling health insurance. See 93 Fed. Res. Bull. C133–36 (2007).
Wellpoint, which was not a BHC, submitted an application to the FDIC to ob-
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after the GLBA was enacted, FHCs discovered that trading
crude oil and wholesale electricity “complemented” their traditional financial activities much better than publishing travel
and culinary magazines. This phenomenon raises critical questions about the scope and practical operation of the undefined
and intentionally broad statutory concept of “complementarity.”
3. A Special Kind of Commerce: Grandfathered Commodities
Activities
In addition to granting FHCs potentially broad and vaguely defined merchant banking and “complementary” powers, the
GLBA contains a special grandfathering provision for commodi114
ties activities. Section 4(o) of the BHCA explicitly authorizes
any company that becomes an FHC after November 12, 1999,
to continue conducting “activities related to the trading, sale, or
investment in commodities and underlying physical proper115
ties,” subject to the following conditions:
(1) the company “lawfully was engaged, directly or indirectly, in any of such activities as of September 30, 1997, in the
116
United States”;
(2) the aggregate consolidated assets of the company attributable to commodities or commodity-related activities, not
otherwise permitted to be held by an FHC, do not exceed five
percent of the company’s total consolidated assets (or such
117
higher percentage threshold as the Board may authorize);
and
(3) the company does not permit cross-marketing of products and services between any of its subsidiaries engaged in the
grandfathered commodities activities and any affiliated U.S.
118
depository institution.
This is a very curious provision that, to date, has remained
tain deposit insurance for its new Utah-chartered industrial bank. Id. at C133.
Although owning an industrial bank would not make Wellpoint a BHC subject
to the BHCA’s activity restrictions, Wellpoint had to request the Board’s determination because, at the time, the FDIC-imposed temporary moratorium on
providing deposit insurance to new industrial banks prohibited approval of
any such applications unless the applicant (Wellpoint, in this instance) engaged exclusively in FHC-permissible activities. See Moratorium on Certain
Industrial Bank Applications and Notices, 72 Fed. Reg. 5,290 (Feb. 5, 2007).
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2012).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 1843(o)(1).
117. Id. § 1843(o)(2).
118. Id. § 1843(o)(3)(A), (B).
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largely unnoticed and rarely, if ever, invoked or discussed in
public discourse or legal analysis. Yet, as discussed below, this
provision is poised to become a potentially critical factor in redrawing the line between banking and commerce in the post119
crisis era. The vague phrasing of this section seems to allow a
qualifying new FHC to conduct not only virtually any kind of
commodity trading but also any related commercial activities
(for example, owning and operating oil terminals and metals
warehouses), if it engaged in any commodities business—even
if on a very limited basis and/or involving different kinds of
120
commodities—prior to the 1997 cut-off date. Potentially, such
a broadly stated exemption may open the door for large financial institutions to conduct sizeable commercial activities of a
121
kind typically not allowed for banking organizations.
To date, the outer limits of the commodities grandfathering
clause have not been tested. It is difficult to assess, therefore,
whether and to what extent this seemingly inconspicuous provision may be used to deal the final death blow to the principle
of separation of banking and commerce. The legislative history
of this special grandfathering clause, however, provides valuable context in which to place analysis. It is also highly instructive from the point of view of the political economy of U.S. financial services regulation.
The grandfathering of pre-existing commodities trading activities was originally proposed in 1995 by Congressman Jim
Leach as part of a broader set of provisions establishing a new
charter for “wholesale financial institutions” (WFIs), which
could conduct a wide range of banking activities but, im122
portantly, could not take federally-insured retail deposits.
Under the proposal, companies that owned or controlled one or
more WFIs (but not FDIC-insured banks)—Wholesale Financial Holding Companies (WFHCs)—would be regulated and su119. See infra Part IV.A.1.
120. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o).
121. The statutory five percent limit on the FHC’s total consolidated assets
attributable to the grandfathered commodities activities is designed to prevent
a dramatic shift in the business profile of such an FHC from financial to purely commercial commodities activities. In absolute terms, however, even such a
small fraction of total consolidated assets of a large FHC may allow for a considerable expansion of its commercial business of owning, producing, transporting, processing, and trading physical commodities. Such an expansion may
very well implicate the fundamental policy concerns underlying the principle
of separation of banking and commerce.
122. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 1062, 104th
Cong. § 109 (1995) (version 1).
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pervised by the Board but less stringently than regular
123
FHCs. These provisions of the House bill were designed specifically to create a so-called “two-way street” for investment
banks to enable them to acquire commercial banks and offer
their institutional clients wholesale banking services without
becoming subject to the full range of activity restrictions under
124
the BHCA.
Because WFIs and their parent companies—
dubbed “woofies”—would not have access to federal deposit insurance and, therefore, were not likely to pose any significant
potential threat to the deposit insurance fund, the proposal authorized them to engage in a broader set of non-financial activities than regular FHCs backed by FDIC insurance. One of these explicit trade-offs involved the grandfathering of woofies’
125
pre-existing commodities trading and related activities.
Curiously, both Goldman and J.P. Morgan were among the
big banks and securities firms that strongly pushed for the pas126
sage of the “woofie” charter. The proposal, however, became a
127
subject of intense political contention in Congress. In contrast
123. Id. In the 1995 versions of the House bill, these WFI holding companies were referred to as “Investment Bank Holding Companies.” Compare H.R.
1062, 104th Cong. § 109 (1995) (version 1), with H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 131
(1998) (version 3, exemplifying the difference in terminology).
124. This is how an American Bankers Association report described the
1997 proposal:
To allow for two-way affiliations between banks and securities
firms, a new type of holding company would be permitted. This would
be the investment bank holding company. These companies would
have still wider powers than the new bank holding company format
would bring, but the separation between banking and commerce
would still be retained. These special holding companies could own
wholesale financial institutions (WFIs, also known as "woofies")
which would be uninsured but also not subject to standard bank holding company firewalls.
Steve Cocheo, Outlook Brightens for New Banking Laws, 89 A.B.A. BANKING J.
10, 10 (1997).
125. Goldman lobbied for specific inclusion of the commodity grandfathering clause in the “woofie” provisions of the House bill because of its existing
investment in J. Aron, a commodity trading company. In fact, at the time, the
commodity grandfathering provision was “widely viewed as the ‘Goldman’ exception.” Martin E. Lybecker, Financial Holding Companies and Financial
Activities Provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in BACK TO THE FUNDAMENTALS: INSURANCE REGULATION, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION, AND INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION H-81 n.11 (ABA-CLE ed., 2001).
126. Dean Anason, Capital Briefs: Wholesale Banking Cut from Reform
Bill, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1999, at 2; Leslie Wayne, Push for Wholesale Banks
Stalls in Overhaul of Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at C2.
127. Some of the most intense battles arose out of the ideologically divisive
issue of applicability of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to “woofies.”
Ultimately, this controversy became one of the main reasons for defeating the
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to the House bill, the Senate version of the reform legislation
128
did not contain “woofie” provisions. In April 1999, however,
Senator Phil Gramm introduced an amendment that effectively
replicated the commodity grandfathering provision for
“woofies” in the House bill—but without any reference to
129
“woofies.” In the Conference, the entire subtitle of the House
130
bill dealing with “woofies” was dropped. The Senate’s broader
version of the commodity-grandfathering clause, however, remained in the text of the GLBA and became the current section
131
4(o) of the BHCA. Thus, an initially limited concession to financial institutions that were explicitly denied access to federal
deposit insurance became an open-ended exemption available
to all newly-registered FHCs fully backed by the federal gov132
ernment guarantees.
To sum up, the GLBA created significant opportunities for
U.S. banking organizations to play a much more direct and active role in purely commercial sectors of the economy—and, especially, in energy and commodities markets. How did this legal and regulatory relaxation of the restrictions on mixing
banking and commerce affect individual FHCs’ actual business
strategies? Did this country’s biggest banking organizations
take advantage of their new powers to break down this venerable wall? Or does the GLBA provide an effective framework for
restraining the expansion of large financial conglomerates’
commercial activities in practice? A closer look at U.S. FHCs’
involvement in the trading of physical commodities provides a
fascinating glimpse of possible answers to these questions.
II. WHAT WE SEE: BANKING ORGANIZATIONS’ ENTRY
INTO PHYSICAL COMMODITIES AND ENERGY TRADING
This Part examines the process of steady regulatory expanproposal. Dean Anason, Reform Panel Approves Packet of Resolutions, but
Tough Issues Await, AM. BANKER, Sept. 30, 1999, at 2; Dean Anason, Reform
Vote Called Off as Republicans Battle CRA, AM. BANKER, Sept. 4, 1998, at 1.
The media also reported at the time that investment banks initially lobbying
for the “woofie” charter, over time, lost interest in the concept, partly because
some of them were acquired by large BHCs and others decided that the new
legislation was evolving in a favorable direction even without the “woofie” provisions. See Wayne, supra note 126.
128. See S. 900, 106th Cong. (1999) (as placed on the Senate calendar, Apr.
28, 1999).
129. S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 3 (1999).
130. Anason, supra note 126, at 2.
131. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2012).
132. See id.
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sion of the scope of FHC-permissible activities in commodity
and energy markets between the enactment of the GLBA and
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. During this period, several large FHCs successfully obtained regulatory approvals to trade physical commodities as an activity comple133
mentary to commodity derivatives trading.
Crucially, however, the system of regulatory reporting has
not been updated to reflect these developments. Contrary to
what one might expect, there is no meaningful public disclosure
of banking organizations’ assets and activities related to physical commodities and energy. Hence, it is important to preface
the discussion by explaining why the American public does not
yet have a full picture of what is happening in this space.
A. WHY OUR VISION IS OBSCURED: A NOTE ON THE
INFORMATIONAL GAP
There are several reasons why the existing public disclosure regime is inadequate to assess the nature and scale of financial institutions’ physical commodity trading operations.
The first difficulty is that publicly-traded financial institutions—including all of the largest FHCs—typically report their
assets, revenues, profits, and other financial information for
the entire business segment, of which commodities trading is
only a part. For instance, Goldman includes commodities in its
Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities (FICC) division,
which is included in the firm’s Institutional Client Services
134
business segment. The same is true of Morgan Stanley, which
includes commodities operations in its Fixed Income and Commodities (FIC) division within the Institutional Securities
135
business segment. Neither firm provides full financial infor133. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C54 (2006); Barclays
Bank PLC, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 511 (2004); UBS AG, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215
(2004).
134. Goldman Sachs Grp, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 1–4 (Feb. 28,
2012) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K]. The firm’s Institutional
Client Services activities are organized by asset class and include both “cash”
and “derivative” instruments. Id. Cash instruments refer to trading in the assets underlying derivative contracts, such as “a stock, bond or barrel of oil.” Id.
at 3. The firm’s annual report does not provide details on their physical commodity operations and simply lists commodity products FICC trades: “Oil and
natural gas, base, precious and other metals, electricity, coal, agricultural and
other commodity products.” Id. at 4. The report states that FICC generally facilitates client transactions and makes markets in commodities. Id. at 115.
135. Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2–3 (Feb. 27, 2012)
[hereinafter Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K]. According to the company’s descrip-
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mation attributable specifically to its commodities divisions.
The second difficulty is that, to the extent FHCs include in
their regulatory filings financial information specific to their
commodities operations, such information usually pertains to
both commodity-linked derivatives operations and trading in
physical commodities. As a result, most financial information
reported under the “commodities” rubric relates to the derivatives business, leaving one to guess what is going on in the
136
firms’ physical commodities businesses. Because of this reporting pattern, industry analysts’ estimates of the revenues or
profits generated by large FHCs’ commodities trading desks often include the estimated revenues and profits from purely financial transactions in commodity derivatives. More broadly,
this disclosure format tends to de-emphasize—and thus make
even less visible—the fact that financial institutions often act
not only as dealers in purely financial risk but also as traditional commodity merchants.
Currently, large FHCs are required to report to the Board,
on a quarterly basis, only one financial metric directly related
to their physical commodities operations: the gross market val137
ue of physical commodities in their trading inventory. These
tion of its activities:
The Company invests and makes markets in the spot, forward,
physical derivatives and futures markets in several commodities, including metals (base and precious), agricultural products, crude oil,
oil products, natural gas, electric power, emission credits, coal,
freight, liquefied natural gas and related products and indices. The
Company is a market-maker in exchange-traded options and futures
and OTC options and swaps on commodities, and offers counterparties hedging programs relating to production, consumption, reserve/inventory management and structured transactions, including
energy-contract securitizations and monetization. The Company is an
electricity power marketer in the U.S. and owns electricity-generating
facilities in the U.S. and Europe.
Id. at 3.
136. For example, in its financial statements for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2012, Goldman reported the revenue from commodities instruments
(both derivative and non-derivative) as $471 million, compared to $957 million
for the same period in 2011. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, For the
Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2012 (Form 10-Q), at 13 (May 9, 2012)
[hereinafter Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-Q]. Similarly, Goldman reported
the average daily Value at Risk (VaR) measure for the commodity prices risk
category (including both financial and cash commodity instruments) as $26
million for the three months ended March 31, 2012, compared to $37 million
for the same quarterly period in 2011. Id. at 155.
137. See CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D (“Trading Assets and Liabilities”), Item
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mandatorily reported data may provide at least a hint of the
potential scale of these activities. For instance, a look at this
line item in JPMC’s filings reveals a significant growth in the
market value of physical commodities the company holds for
trading purposes. Thus, as of March 31, 2009, JPMC reported
the gross fair value of physical commodities in its inventory as
138
a relatively modest $3.7 billion. By September 30, 2009, the
139
amount had doubled to $7.9 billion. By the end of 2009, the
140
number had further increased to slightly over $10 billion. At
the end of 2010, the reported amount reached above $21 bil141
lion. As of December 31, 2011, JPMC reported the gross fair
value of physical commodities in its inventory at approximately
142
$26 billion. As of March 31, 2012, the gross fair value of physical commodities in JPMC’s inventory had slightly decreased to
143
$17.2 billion. At the end of 2012, that number was $16.2 bil144
lion.
Morgan Stanley’s regulatory filings show that, as of March
31, 2009, the gross fair value of physical commodities it held in
145
inventory was slightly below $2.5 billion. The reported value
of this line item in Morgan Stanley’s reports rapidly increased
M.9.a(2) (“Gross fair value of physical commodities held in inventory.”). Form
FR Y-9C is a quarterly report filed with the Board by BHCs with total consolidated assets of $500 million or more, which the Board is authorized by statute
to require. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (2013).
138. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Mar. 31, 2009).
139. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Sept. 30, 2009).
140. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Dec. 31, 2009).
141. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Dec. 31, 2010).
142. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Dec. 31, 2011).
143. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Mar. 31, 2012).
144. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Dec. 31, 2012).
145. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Mar. 31,
2009).
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146

to $10.3 billion as of September 30, 2011, before going slight147
ly down to approximately $9.6 billion as of March 31, 2012.
At the end of 2012, the gross fair value of physical commodities
148
in Morgan Stanley’s inventory was about $7.3 billion.
Goldman’s filings show more fluctuations in the gross fair
value of physical commodities in the firm’s inventory during
the same three-year period. Specifically, as of March 31, 2009,
149
Goldman reported $1.2 billion in this line item. At the end of
150
the next quarter, the number fell to $682 million. It peaked
151
at the end of 2010 at over $13 billion. As of March 31, 2012,
Goldman reported the gross fair value of its physical commodi152
ties inventory at $9.5 billion. At the end of 2012, Goldman’s
153
number rose to $11.7 billion.
As issuers of publicly traded securities, FHCs include the
154
same data in their quarterly reports filed with the SEC. The
gross market value of FHCs’ physical commodity trading inventory, however, measures solely their current exposure to com155
modity price risk. It does not provide a full picture of these
organizations’ actual involvement in the business of producing,
146. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Sept. 30,
2011).
147. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Mar. 31,
2012).
148. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Dec. 31,
2012).
149. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Mar. 31, 2009).
150. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(June 30, 2009).
151. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Dec. 31, 2010).
152. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Mar. 31, 2012).
153. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2)
(Dec. 31, 2012).
154. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-Q, supra note 136, at 18.
155. Similarly, the VaR data included in FHCs’ SEC filings provide a
measure of their exposure to commodity price risk. See id. at 154 (“VaR is the
potential loss in value of inventory positions due to adverse market movements over a defined time horizon with a specified confidence level.”).
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extracting, processing, transporting, or storing physical commodities. To a great extent, this nearly exclusive regulatory focus on commodity price risk reflects the underlying assumption
that U.S. banking organizations do not conduct any commodityrelated activities that could potentially pose any additional
risks to their safety and soundness or create systemic vulnerabilities. If one assumes that banking organizations act only as
arms’ length buyers and sellers of physical commodities, strictly for the purpose of providing financial risk management services to their clients, then it is logical to conclude that sudden
price fluctuations in commodity markets are the main source of
potential risk from such activities. In the absence of detailed
information on U.S. banking organizations’ actual commodities
assets and operations, however, this assumption becomes dan156
gerously unreliable.
Gaps in the current system of public disclosure and regulatory reporting explain the near-absence of reliable, detailed data on the precise nature and full scope of U.S. banking organizations’ physical commodity operations. The traditional lack of
transparency in global commodity markets and the inherently
secretive nature of the commodity trading industry create a
third source of difficulties for understanding what exactly U.S.
FHCs do, and how significant their role is, in these markets. A
handful of large, mostly Switzerland-based commodities trad157
158
159
ing houses—including Glencore,
Vitol,
Trafigura,
160
161
Mercuria, and Gunvor —dominate the global trade in oil
156. There may be ways to collect some information on FHCs’ physical
commodities activities from a wide variety of diverse sources, including statistical records maintained by the Department of Energy (DOE), FERC, or other
non-financial regulators. However, theoretical availability of these disparate
data does not cure the fundamental informational deficiency in this area. Even
if it can be located, with significant effort, such amalgamation of data is not
likely to create a complete and reliable picture of large FHCs’ commodity operations and assets.
157. Switzerland-based Glencore is the world’s largest independent commodity trading company with significant production assets. See At a Glance,
GLENCOREXSTRATA, http://www.glencorexstrata.com/about-us/at-a-glance (last
visited Oct. 9, 2013).
158. Switzerland-based Vitol is one of the largest independent oil and gas
trading companies in the world. See About Vitol, VITOL, http://www.vitol.com/
about-vitol.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
159. See About Us, TRAFIGURA, http://www.trafigura.com/about-us (last
visited Oct. 9, 2013).
160. See Business Development, MERCURIA, http://www.mercuria.com/about
-us/business-development (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
161. Switzerland-based Gunvor is co-founded and co-owned by a Russian
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and gas, petroleum products, coal, metals, and other prod162
ucts. Nearly all of these publicity-shy commodities trading
163
firms are privately owned. They do not publicly report results
of their financial operations and generally refrain from disclosing information about the structure or performance of their investments. Secrecy has always been an important attribute of
the traditional commodities trading business, in which access
to information is vital to commercial success, and having in164
formational advantage often translates into windfall profits.
Given this lack of transparency and secretive nature of the
commodities trading business, it is nearly impossible for an industry outsider—and even for most insiders—to gauge accurately the relative size and importance of U.S. FHCs as traders
165
and dealers in the global markets for physical commodities.
oil tycoon, Gennady Timchenko, whose reported close ties to Russia’s President Putin gave rise to many speculations as to the true reasons for the company’s success. See Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Gunvor, Putin and Me”—Oil Trader
Speaks Out, REUTERS, May 22, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2008/05/22/us-putin-gunvor-idUSL228794620080522; From Petrograd
to Petrodollars, THE ECONOMIST, May 5, 2012, http://www.economist.com/
node/21554184. See generally GUNVOR GROUP, http://gunvorgroup.com (last
visited Oct. 9, 2013).
162. Javier Blas, Trading Houses: Veil Slowly Lifts on a Secretive Profession, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8028cb0-84cf
-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dOuRafF9 [hereinafter Blas, Trading
Houses].
163. Jack Farchy, Commodity Houses Court Outside Investors, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2b0b982c-8dee-11e1-bbae-00144f
eab49a.html. A rare exception to this rule is Glencore, which became a publicly traded company in May 2011. See History, GLENCOREXSTRATA, http://
www.glencorexstrata.com/about-us/history (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
164. Blas, Trading Houses, supra note 162.
165. This is especially true of oil and gas markets. Currently, the markets
for trading crude oil and oil products are dominated by three groups of players:
major oil companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and British Petroleum), independent commodity trading houses (Vitol, Gunvor, Glencore, Trafigura, and
Mercuria), and financial institutions (Morgan Stanley and Goldman). See GATI
AL-JEBOURI, LITASCO SA, INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND OIL TRADING 6
(2008),
available
at
http://www.litasco.com/_library/pdf/social_acts/
international_oil_market_and_oil_trading.pdf. Although these three types of
oil traders have significantly different business structures and profiles, they
have been converging in some important respects. Thus, the trading arms of
oil majors and commodity trading houses have been developing active financial derivatives trading and dealing capabilities to supplement their traditional operations in physical markets. Recent media reports indicate that independent commodity trading companies have also been acquiring both
upstream (oil production) assets and downstream (refining and processing)
assets. See Javier Blas, Commodities Traders Face Growing Pains, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ae89836-8f78-11e1-9ab1-00144f
eab49a.html#axzz2dOuRafF9; Blas, Trading Houses, supra note 162. It is
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Nevertheless, even with these powerful blinders obscuring
our vision, we can start tracing the path that led U.S. banking
organizations to their current prominence in physical commodities markets. As it often happens in the banking world, the first
step on that path was made possible by a seemingly routine
regulatory agency action.
B. LET’S GET PHYSICAL: THE SCOPE OF FHCS’
“COMPLEMENTARY” POWERS
Even before the enactment of the GLBA, U.S. commercial
banks and their affiliates had become actively involved in trading and dealing in financial derivatives—publicly-traded futures and various over-the-counter contracts—linked to the
166
prices of commodities. Since the mid-1980s, the OCC has
been aggressively interpreting the bank powers clause of the
National Bank Act to include derivatives trading and dealing
167
as part of the “business of banking.” Similarly, under the
BHCA, trading in commodity derivatives is generally treated as
a financial activity that raises no controversial legal issues.
Handling physical commodities, however, was a much different matter. Even physical settlement of permissible commodity derivatives—which necessitated taking ownership,
transporting, and storing actual crude oil or iron ore—
presented a problem in light of the general principle of separating banking from commerce. Despite industry lobbying, the
Board refused to add the acceptance and delivery of physical
commodities to the list of activities “closely related to banking”
168
when it amended Regulation Y in 1997. By that time, the
OCC was already allowing national banks to take delivery of
physical commodities by warehouse receipt or on a “passthrough” basis, as part of hedging otherwise permissible comnearly impossible, however, to ascertain how big or important financial institutions’ physical oil- and gas-trading operations are vis-à-vis the other two
groups, in large part because that would require access to potentially sensitive
non-public information on the oil companies’ and trading houses’ operations
and activities. In an informal interview with the author, a professional oil industry consultant who wished to remain anonymous claimed that even a
rough estimate would require a lot of sophisticated and prohibitively expensive investigative work not dissimilar to industrial espionage. For obvious reasons, such investigation does not appear to be feasible for the purposes of this
Article.
166. See generally Omarova, supra note 30.
167. Id.
168. FEIN, supra note 43, § 18.07[6], at 18–38.
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169

modity derivatives transactions. The Board explained its reluctance to grant broad authority for BHCs to engage in physically settled commodity transactions by citing “issues involving
risk management policies and procedures that are more appro170
priately addressed through the application review process.”
In the early 2000s, global commodities markets began experiencing a sharp and sustained rise in prices, building up to a
major commodity boom. According to the World Bank, between
2003 and 2008, “[a]verage commodity prices doubled in U.S.
dollar terms (in part boosted by dollar depreciation), making
this boom longer and stronger than any boom in the 20th cen171
tury.” The beginning of this unprecedented commodity price
boom coincided with the increased push by large U.S. financial
institutions to establish large-scale physical commodity trading
operations.
In 2003, the Board finally amended Regulation Y’s “laundry list” of permissible non-banking activities to allow BHCs to
accept or “make delivery of title to commodities underlying de172
rivative contracts on an instantaneous, pass-through basis.”
The amended Regulation Y, however, imposes conditions on
BHCs’ authority to engage as principals in physically settled
commodity derivatives, to ensure that a BHC would not take
173
physical possession of the underlying commodity. These conditions reflect the Board’s apparent unease with granting
169. Omarova, supra note 30, at 1085–87.
170. Federal Reserve System, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,290, 9,311–12 (Feb. 28, 1997)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2013).
171. THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2009: COMMODITIES AT THE CROSSROADS 51 (2009), available at http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/10363_WebPDF-w47.pdf.
Although
commodity prices fell sharply in late 2008 as a result of the unfolding credit
crisis, they recovered strongly between 2009 and 2011, rising almost to their
peak 2008 levels. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
JANUARY 2012, COMMODITY ANNEX 1 (2012), available at http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1322593305595/8287139
-1326374900917/GEP2012A_Commodity_Appendix.pdf.
172. Federal Reserve System, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (July 3, 2003) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225).
173. Id. Regulation Y explicitly requires that a BHC either make every
reasonable effort to avoid physical delivery or effect delivery by instantaneous
transfer of title to a third party, without taking physical possession of the underlying commodity. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8) (2013). In addition, the derivative
contract must allow for assignment, termination, or offset prior to delivery. Id.
In the absence of such provisions, the contract must be approved for trading
on a U.S. contract market (even though it may not be actually traded on any
futures exchange) by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Id.
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BHCs a blanket authority to engage in activities so closely resembling those of commodity merchants.
Thus, while trading in commodity derivatives is a financial
activity permissible for FHCs, trading in the physical commodities underlying such derivatives transactions generally constitutes an impermissible commercial activity even in the postGLBA era. FHCs seeking to engage in physical trades must
find a specific legal authority to do so. Just as the global commodity markets were entering the period of unprecedented
price rises, several large U.S. FHCs and foreign banks successfully obtained Board orders allowing them to trade physical
commodities as an activity complementary to the financial activity of trading and dealing in commodity derivatives.
1. Permissible Physical Commodities Trading
In 2003, Citigroup became the first to receive Board approval of its physical commodities trading as a “complemen174
tary” activity. Under the Board’s order, Citigroup was allowed to purchase and sell oil, natural gas, agricultural
products, and other non-financial commodities in the spot market and to take and make physical delivery of commodities to
175
settle permissible commodity derivative transactions.
The
Board based its determination on four main considerations.
First, the Board found that the proposed activities “flowed”
from FHCs’ legitimate financial activities, essentially providing
them with an alternative method of fulfilling their obligations
176
under otherwise permissible derivatives transactions.
Second, permitting these activities would make FHCs more competitive vis-à-vis other financial firms not subject to regulatory
177
restrictions on physically settled derivatives transactions.
Third, the proposed activities would enable FHCs to offer a full
range of commodity-related services to their clients in a more
178
efficient manner. Finally, conducting physical commodity activities would enhance FHCs’ understanding of the commodity
179
derivatives market.
174. Citigroup Inc., Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activity, 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 508 (2003) [hereinafter
Citigroup Order].
175. Id.
176. Id. at 509.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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To minimize the safety and soundness risks that this type
of commercial activity may pose, the Board imposed a number
of conditions on Citigroup’s commodity-trading business. First,
the market value of any commodities owned by Citigroup may
180
not exceed five percent of its consolidated Tier 1 capital. This
market value limitation is generally meant to ensure that physical commodity trading does not grow too big, at least in rela181
tive terms. Second, unless the Board specifically allows otherwise, Citigroup may take or make delivery only of those
commodities for which derivatives contracts have been approved for trading on U.S. futures exchanges by the Commodity
182
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). This requirement was
designed to prevent Citigroup from dealing in finished goods
and other items, such as real estate, which lack the fungibility
183
and liquidity of exchange-traded commodities.
Third, the
Board made clear that Citigroup must conduct its physical
commodity trading business in compliance with the applicable
184
securities, commodities, and energy laws.
Finally, the Citigroup Order stated that the FHC was not
“authorized to (i) own, operate, or invest in facilities for the extraction, transportation, storage, or distribution of commodi185
ties; or (ii) process, refine, or otherwise alter commodities.”
The expectation was that Citigroup would use storage and
transportation facilities owned and operated by unrelated third
186
parties. The purpose of this important limitation is to minimize non-financial risks inherent in physical commodity trading: storage risk, transportation risk, and potentially serious
environmental and legal risks associated with these activi180. Id. If the market value of physical commodities held by Citigroup as a
result of its commodity-trading activities exceeds four percent of its consolidated Tier 1 capital, Citigroup has to notify the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY). In 2003, Citigroup reported its total consolidated Tier 1 capital
of nearly $66.9 billion. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 89
(Dec. 31, 2003). This puts the numerical limit for the market value of the physical commodities held by Citigroup for 2003 at slightly above $3.1 billion. Id.
181. Citigroup Order, supra note 174, at 5. It is difficult to eliminate some
degree of arbitrariness in setting this threshold, however. Generally, the “fivepercent” limit seems to be a particularly popular numerical marker that appears in various contexts in federal bank regulation. It is not entirely clear
why this magic number is especially reasonable in any particular context.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 6.
184. Id. at 8.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 7.
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187

ties.
The Board relied on specific representations from
Citigroup to the effect that it would exercise heightened care in
avoiding these non-financial risks. Thus, Citigroup represented
that it would require the owner of any vessel carrying oil on
behalf of Citigroup to carry the maximum insurance for oil pollution available from a protection and indemnity club and to
obtain a substantial amount of additional pollution insur188
ance. Similarly, it promised to require all third-party storage
facilities to carry a significant amount of oil pollution insurance
189
from a creditworthy insurance company. Citigroup would also
place age limitations on vessels and develop a comprehensive
backup plan in the event any owner of a vessel or storage facili190
ty fails to respond adequately to an oil spill.
In subsequent years, the Board granted similar orders authorizing physical commodity trading activities on the part of
FHCs and foreign banks treated as FHCs for purposes of the
BHCA. These grants of complementary powers allowed large
191
192
193
non-U.S. banks—such as UBS, Barclays, Deutsche Bank,
194
and Société Générale —to expand their worldwide physical
commodities businesses by adding U.S. operations, albeit on a
somewhat limited scale. In 2005, JPMC also obtained an order
permitting the FHC to engage in physical commodity trading
activities as complementary to its booming financial derivatives
195
business. In all of these cases, the Board imposed the same
standard set of conditions and limitations originally articulated
in the Citigroup Order.
In 2008, The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), then the U.K.’s
largest banking group, received the Board’s order authorizing a
187. Id. at 6. For example, one can imagine a situation in which an explosion aboard an oil tanker, owned or operated by one of Citigroup’s subsidiaries, results in multiple human injuries and deaths, loss of property, failure to
fulfill contractual obligations to third parties, and significant environmental
damage—all of which would expose Citigroup to private lawsuits, regulatory
enforcement actions, and even criminal liability.
188. Id. at 7.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. UBS AG, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 (2004).
192. Barclays Bank PLC, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 511 (2004).
193. Deutsche Bank AG, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C54 (2006).
194. Société Générale, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C113 (2006).
195. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 (2006). Bank of
America and Wachovia received Board approvals to conduct physical commodities trading in 2006–07. See Letter from Board to Bank of Am. Corp. (Apr. 24,
2007); Letter from Board to Wachovia Corp. (Apr. 13, 2006).
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wide range of physical commodities and energy trading activities as complementary to RBS’s financial derivatives activi196
ties. RBS sought these expanded powers in connection with
its acquisition of a fifty-one percent equity stake in a joint ven197
ture with Sempra Energy, a U.S. utility group. The joint venture, RBS Sempra Commodities (RBS Sempra), was set up to
conduct a worldwide business of trading in various physical
commodities—including oil, natural gas, coal, and non-precious
metals—and be an active player in power markets in Asia and
198
North America.
In the RBS Order, the Board significantly relaxed the
standard limitations and expanded the scope of permissible
trading in physical commodities. Thus, the Board allowed RBS
to take and make physical deliveries of nickel, even though
nickel futures were not approved for trading on U.S. futures
exchanges by the CFTC. The Board reasoned that contracts for
nickel were actively traded on the LME, a major non-U.S. exchange subject to regulation comparable to the regulation of the
199
U.S. futures exchanges. The Board also authorized physical
trading in a long list of physical commodities—including natural gasoline, asphalt, kerosene, and other oil products and petrochemicals—despite the fact that contracts for these commodities have not been approved for trading on any major
200
exchange. In authorizing physical trading in these commodities, the Board relied on the fact that these commodities were
fungible and that contracts for them were traded in sufficiently
liquid over-the-counter markets (through individual brokers
201
and on alternative trading platforms).
Although previous orders prohibited FHCs from refining or
processing commodities they traded, the Board authorized RBS
to hire third parties to refine, blend, or otherwise alter the
202
commodities. In effect, this removed the ambiguity in previous orders by explicitly allowing RBS, for example, to sell crude
196. The Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60 (2008)
[hereinafter RBS Order].
197. Philip Aldrick, RBS Buys Majority Stake in Sempra, TELEGRAPH, Jul.
10,
2007,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2811893/RBS-buys
-majority-stake-in-Sempra.html.
198. Id.
199. RBS Order, supra note 196, at C62–C63.
200. Id.
201. Id. “Fungibility” means that market participants contract for stated
quantities but cannot specify the exact product or lot they want to receive. Id.
202. Id. at C61.
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oil to an oil refinery and then buy back the refined oil product.
The Board determined that this activity essentially posed the
same risks as hiring a third party to operate a storage or
203
transportation facility, as permitted under previous orders.
In addition, RBS made a specific commitment that it would not
204
have exclusive rights to use the alteration facility.
The Board also authorized RBS to enter into long-term
electricity supply contracts with large industrial and commercial customers. The Board noted that, while most commodities
traded by FHCs were limited to wholesale markets, electric
205
power could much more easily reach small retail customers.
To ensure that RBS remained a wholesale electric power intermediary dealing only with sophisticated customers, the RBS
Order specified the minimum consumption levels for customers
to whom RBS was allowed to sell electricity on a long-term ba206
sis.
2. Energy Management and Energy Tolling
The RBS Order is especially noteworthy as an example of a
large FHC expanding the scope and nature of its energy business beyond the traditional model of buying and selling commodities. In the RBS Order and in two separate orders issued
to a Belgian-Dutch bank, Fortis, the Board specifically approved so-called energy management and energy tolling ser207
vices they sought to perform in the United States.
These orders authorized RBS and Fortis to provide certain
energy management services—consisting of transactional and
advisory services—to owners of power generation facilities un208
der Energy Management Agreements (EMA).
FHCpermissible energy management services generally entail acting as a financial intermediary for a power plant owner to facilitate purchases of fuel and sales of power by the plant, as well
209
as advising the owner on risk-management strategies. Thus,
the energy manager—Fortis or RBS—would buy fuel for the
203. Id. at C64.
204. Id. at C67.
205. Id. at C64.
206. Id.
207. Fortis S.A./N.V., 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C20 (2008) [hereinafter Fortis Order]; RBS Order, supra note 196; Letter from Board to Fortis S.A/N.V. (May
21, 2008) [hereinafter Fortis Board Letter].
208. See Fortis Order, supra note 207, at C20.
209. Id.
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plant from third parties and sell it to the plant in a mirror
transaction. It would then purchase the power generated by the
210
plant and resell it in the market. In effect, the energy manager would provide credit and liquidity support for the plant
owner, including the posting of any required collateral for
211
transactions. In addition, the manager also would assume responsibility for administrative tasks in connection with, and
212
the hedging of exposure under, fuel and power transactions.
FHC-permissible energy management services, however,
are subject to several conditions designed to limit the safety
and soundness risks of such activities. Thus, the Board required that the revenues attributable to the FHC’s energy
management services not exceed five percent of its total consol213
idated operating revenues. The Board also required that all
EMAs, pursuant to which the FHC engages in these activities,
include certain mandatory provisions. For example, the EMA
must mandate that the plant owner approve all contracts for
purchases of fuel and sales of electricity, although the owner
may be allowed to grant a standing authorization to the manager to enter into contracts that meet certain owner-specified
214
criteria. The owner must retain responsibility for the day-today maintenance and management of the power generation facility, including hiring employees to operate it. The owner must
also retain the right to (i) market and sell power directly to
third parties, although the manager may have the right of first
refusal; and (ii) determine the facility’s power output level at
215
any given time. In addition, the FHC is prohibited, directly or
through its subsidiaries, from guaranteeing the financial performance of the power plant and from bearing any risk of loss if
216
the plant is not profitable.
Energy tolling is generally similar to energy management.
The Board authorized RBS and Fortis to enter into energy toll-

210. Id. at C21.
211. Id.
212. The administrative tasks include, among other things, arranging for
third parties to provide fuel transportation or power transmission services,
coordinating fuel purchases and power sales, negotiating and monitoring contracts with the plant owner’s counterparties. See Fortis Order, supra note 207.
213. Id. at C22. This revenue limit is the functional equivalent of the market value limit the Board imposed on physical commodities activities.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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ing agreements that have certain characteristics. Under these arrangements, an FHC (the toller) makes fixed periodic
(usually, monthly) “capacity payments” to the power plant
owner, to compensate the owner for its fixed costs, in exchange
218
for the right to all or part of the plant’s power output. The
plant owner retains control over the day-to-day operation of the
power plant. The toller pays for the fuel needed to produce the
power it directs the owner to produce. The owner receives a
marginal payment for each megawatt hour produced by the
plant, as compensation for its variable costs plus a profit mar219
gin. As the Board explained it, the toll is:
similar to a call option on the power produced by the plant with a
strike price linked to fuel and power prices. In general, the toller
would direct the operator to run the plant (i.e., the toller would exercise its option) when the price of power exceeds the cost of producing
that amount of power. Some tolling agreements may also give the toller the right to a plant’s excess capacity, which the toller may sell to
220
the market or use to meet reliability obligations to the power grid.

The Board approved energy tolling as a complementary activity because it is an “outgrowth” of the relevant FHC’s per221
missible commodity derivatives activities. It reasoned that
permitting energy tolling would provide the FHC with valuable
information on the energy markets, which would help it to
manage its own commodity risk. It would also allow the FHC to
compete more effectively with other financial firms not subject
to the BHCA.
C. THE BOUNDARIES OF “COMPLEMENTARITY”
An overview of the Board’s grants of complementary powers to FHCs to engage in physical commodities and energy
trading activities reveals an inherent flaw in the regulatory
concept of “complementarity” that, in effect, fails to impose
meaningful limits on the expansion of banking organizations’
commercial businesses.
Under the Board’s pre-crisis decisions, the main limitation
on FHCs’ complementary powers to engage in physical commodities and energy activities is the regulatory requirement
that FHCs not own, operate, or invest in the facilities for extraction, transportation, storage, and distribution of commodi217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See RBS Order, supra note 196; Fortis Board Letter, supra note 207.
See RBS Order, supra note 196, at C64.
Id.
Id. (internal formatting omitted).
Id. at C65.
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ties. Under these orders, FHCs generally have to lease, rent, or
charter such facilities. It appears that this is where the Board
draws the line, out of its (at this point, apparently residual)
concern about allowing FHCs to get directly involved in purely
commercial activities. The Fortis and RBS Orders, however,
raise an interesting question about the real impact of this prohibition. Thus, the energy management and tolling arrangements described in these orders look very much like the functional equivalent of owning a power generating facility. Even
with all of the Board-mandated contractual provisions guaranteeing a certain role for the plant owner, these agreements give
the FHCs control over the plant’s operation and output. In effect, the FHC obtains a contractually captive power generator,
which allows it to build or expand its business supplying electricity under long-term contracts in wholesale power markets.
How “complementary” would this type of wholesale power
marketing business be to any financial activity of RBS or Fortis? As the Board emphasized, a complementary activity must
have some “meaningful connection” to a bona fide financial activity of an FHC, and a grant of complementary powers must
enable the FHC to engage in commercial activities only “to a
222
limited extent.” The Board approved these energy trading activities and other physical commodities trading because they
naturally “flow” or “grow out of” the BHC-permissible electrici223
ty and commodity-linked derivatives trading. Yet, this argument is too superficial to be convincing. Any number of commercial activities can be connected to trading and dealing in
derivatives, by virtue of the simple fact that derivatives can be
224
linked to any asset. That this type of “complementarity” is
222. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,493 (Dec. 9, 2003).
223. Id.
224. For example, if an FHC trades in weather derivatives, does that mean
the FHC can also build and operate satellites and radar systems used in meteorological forecasting as a complementary activity? Can that FHC also own
construction companies that build homes able to withstand severe storms in
hurricane-prone areas? Conveniently, the same FHC, through a bank subsidiary, can also provide financing to purchasers of such homes and perhaps insure those homes and securitize the loans. These would be purely financial activities that could serve as a starting point for a new set of the FHC’s
“complementary” commercial business activities. The same logic may be applied to envision a new chain of commercial and financial activities plausibly
connected to derivatives referencing a different asset category. At some point,
a list of commercial activities potentially related to some form of a derivative
product would probably grow to encompass the entire universe of economic enterprise.
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used to justify banking organizations’ direct involvement in
power generation and marketing reveals something very important about the role of derivatives trading as a bankpermissible activity. Trading and dealing in these infinitely
malleable instruments, which effectively translate every economic value into quantifiable financial risk, seems to have created an instant set of potential synergies with every conceivable economic activity. Taken at face value, the familiar
arguments about the benefits to the banking institutions of being able to engage in commercial activities that “naturally” flow
out of their derivatives activities raise a fundamental policy
question: if such connection is truly necessary, should banking
institutions be allowed to trade in derivatives? To put it boldly,
may unlimited trading and dealing in derivatives—or, at least,
certain kinds of derivatives—be potentially inconsistent with
the principle of separating banking from commerce? Although
these complex policy issues are beyond the scope of this Article,
they highlight a critical flaw in the amorphous notion of “complementarity.”
It is worth noting that FHCs began actively seeking expanded authority to conduct physical commodities and energy
trading activities in the early 2000s—soon after the fall of Enron, the pioneer in financializing commodity and energy mar225
kets. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions as to whether there is a direct causal connection between these
phenomena. Yet, one can identify at least one key link in this
respect: the rise, in the wake of Enron’s failure, of Goldman
and Morgan Stanley, then independent investment banks, as
top players in global markets for physical commodities and energy. Their preeminence as commodity derivatives dealers and
access to cheap and plentiful credit and liquidity gave Goldman
and Morgan Stanley key advantage over large energy compa226
nies that attempted to replicate Enron’s initial success. These
two firms, which at the time were not subject to the BHCA’s activity restrictions, were also Citigroup’s and JPMC’s main com227
petitors in the commodity derivatives space. In authorizing
225. Shiela McNulty, Speculators Return in Wake of Enron, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24cd3dcc-1b74-11e1-8647-00144fe
abdc0.html#axzz2gX8IEQC5.
226. Large energy companies, including Dynegy and Duke Energy, tried to
follow Enron’s model by combining large-scale physical and derivatives trading but failed due mainly to capital constraints and limited access to credit
necessary for sustaining it. Id.
227. Id.
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FHCs to trade in physical commodities, the Board meant to
remedy their competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Goldman and
Morgan Stanley.
Of course, before the autumn of 2008, nobody could imagine that both of these institutions would voluntarily become
BHCs, in the midst of a major financial crisis—and that their
conversion would bring the salience of U.S. banking institutions’ commodity trading activities to a whole new level.
III. WHAT WE DON’T (YET) SEE: HOW THE CRISIS
CHANGED THE PHYSICAL COMMODITIES TRADING
GAME
One of the most profound and least appreciated consequences of the recent financial crisis is the emergence of a powerful trio of large FHCs with extensive physical commodities
business operations: Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC.
Two extraordinary crisis-driven phenomena led to this result:
the emergency conversion of Morgan Stanley and Goldman into
BHCs and the once-in-a-lifetime acquisition by JPMC of the
commodity assets of two failing institutions, Bear Stearns and
RBS.
On September 21, 2008, Morgan Stanley and Goldman received approval to register as BHCs subject to the Board’s regulation and supervision, in a desperate effort to bolster investor
228
confidence and avoid potential creditor run on their assets. In
the midst of the unfolding crisis, the Board approved these
firms’ applications to become BHCs almost literally overnight,
without putting them through its normal, lengthy and detailed
review process. It is highly unlikely that, at the time of the
conversion, the Board focused on these firms’ extensive physical commodities assets and activities—or gave full consideration to the question of how to deal with such activities in the
long run.
JPMC followed a different route to the top of the Wall
Street commodities game. In 2008, the firm acquired the physi229
cal commodity trading assets of failing Bear Stearns. In 20092010, JPMC bought the global commodities business of nation228. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C101, C102, 2008 WL
7861871, at *4 (Nov. 1, 2008); Morgan Stanley, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C103, C105,
2008 WL 7861872, at *5 (Sept. 21, 2008).
229. Morgan Stanley May Sell Part of Commods Unit: CNBC, REUTERS,
June 6, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/us
-morganstanley-commodities-idUSBRE8550ND20120606 [hereinafter CNBC].
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230

alized RBS. In a few short years, the firm’s aggressive growth
strategy transformed it into one of the three biggest U.S. bank231
ing organizations dominating global commodity markets.
Thus, in the wake of the financial crisis, the Board finds itself facing a qualitatively different commodities business conducted by three of the largest U.S. banking organizations. Under the BHCA, a newly-registered BHC has up to five years
from the registration date either to divest its impermissible
non-banking activities or to bring such activities into compli232
ance with BHCA requirements. The statutory five-year grace
period for the non-conforming commodity activities of Goldman
and Morgan Stanley ends in the fall of 2013, at which point the
Board must make a potentially fateful decision whether these
firms will be able to continue—and further expand—their
commodity and energy merchant businesses. This decision,
however, requires a thorough understanding of the nature and
scope of these institutions’ actual involvement in physical
commodities and energy markets.
As discussed above, general news and business media reports remain the main source of publicly available information
on FHCs’ activities in physical commodities and energy mar233
kets. Based primarily on the analysis and synthesis of media
reports, the following sections describe what is publicly known
about the nature and scope of the physical commodities activities of the three FHCs with the largest presence in that space:
Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC.
A. MORGAN STANLEY AND GOLDMAN SACHS: PLAYING FOR THE
NEW CLUB
Prior to their emergency conversion into BHCs in September 2008, Goldman and Morgan Stanley were independent investment banks with extensive equity investments in various
234
commercial businesses. Even among their peers, however,
Goldman and Morgan Stanley stood out as the “original ‘Wall
Street refiners’ that pioneered the modern energy derivatives

230. Id.
231. Id. Among non-U.S. financial institutions, only UK’s Barclays and
Germany’s Deutsche Bank currently compete with Morgan Stanley, Goldman
and JPMC in global commodity markets. Id.
232. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (2012).
233. See supra Part II.A.
234. CNBC, supra note 229.

312

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:265

235

market two decades ago.” In addition to their dominant position as major dealers in commodities derivatives, both firms
have established themselves as the key players in the production, processing, transportation, storage, and trading of a wide
236
range of physical commodities.
Both Morgan Stanley and Goldman began actively expanding their physical commodity operations in the early 2000s, in
237
response to the commodity price boom. There are two main
reasons for this expansion. First, direct participation in the
production and marketing of physical commodities yields crucial informational advantages for these firms’ derivatives trad238
ing business. Continuous access to inside information on current price trends in the commodity spot markets enhances their
ability to price and trade commodity-linked derivatives in the
most profitable ways. Physical assets—pipelines, tankers, ter239
minals, and warehouses—are “invaluable tools for traders.”
According to a former Morgan Stanley trader, “[i]t’s as if you
are a traffic cop sitting in the middle of an intersection, you see
240
everything go by.”
Second, the steady upward trend in global commodities
prices since the early 2000s, going hand in hand with the increasing flow of financial investors’ money into the sector, made
physical commodity trading potentially a lucrative business in
241
its own right. Buying, selling, storing, and moving commodities can generate handsome profits in a world that depends on
the flow of these commodities for its very survival.
In practice, it is difficult to separate these two rationales
for a firm like Goldman or Morgan Stanley to get involved in
global commodity trading business. Until recently, the two
firms seemed to pursue relatively different strategies in this
area. Throughout the 1990s, Goldman focused primarily on
commodity-linked derivatives, while Morgan Stanley built
242
strong physical commodities trading operations. The latest
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Jeanine Prezioso, Morgan Stanley Latest US Bank to Lose Traders to
Merchant Firm, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/06/morganstanley-mercuria-traders-idUSL2E8K67QA2012
0906.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Javier Blas, Commodities Trading Loses Its Goldman Queen, FIN.
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commodity price boom made these differences less meaningful,
243
as Goldman moved aggressively into the physical space.
Even after becoming FHCs subject to the BHCA, Goldman
and Morgan Stanley remain the top players in both derivatives
244
and physical commodity markets. This change in their regulatory status, however, fundamentally altered the broader context of U.S. bank holding company regulation and elevated to a
new, previously unseen level the inherent tension between the
principle of separation of banking and commerce, on the one
hand, and the reality of large FHCs’ growing commercial empires, on the other.
1. Morgan Stanley: Oil, Tankers, and Pipelines
During the years preceding the latest financial crisis, Morgan Stanley built a significant business trading in oil, gas, elec245
tric power, metals, and other commodity products. According
to industry estimates, Morgan Stanley’s commodities unit generated $17 billion in revenue over the past decade, trading both
246
financial contracts and physical commodities.
Unlike its
archrival Goldman, however, Morgan Stanley “has remained
resolutely a merchant-trader, focusing on the business of stor247
ing or transporting raw materials.” According to a 2008 research report, traditional client “flow” business—marketmaking, selling indices to investors, and commodity risk hedging—constituted only about ten to fifteen percent of the firm’s
248
commodities activities. About half of Morgan Stanley’s commodities business is reportedly in crude oil and oil products,
249
while about forty percent is in power and gas.
Morgan Stanley has been using physical assets in trading
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ec8af7f0-3d02-11e1-ae07
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2eJIq1WUk.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, 2012 GREENWICH LEADERS: OTC
COMMODITIES DERIVATIVES (2012); Alexander Osipovich, Risk and Energy
Risk—2012 Commodity Rankings—Energy, RISK.NET (Feb. 9, 2012), http://
www.risk.net/energy-risk/research/2144918/risk-energy-commodity-rankings
-2012-energy.
245. CNBC, supra note 229.
246. Id.
247. Matthew Robinson & Scott DiSavino, Deal or No Deal, Morgan Stanley Commodity Trade Shrinks, REUTERS, Jun. 7. 2012, available at http://www
.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/morganstanley-commodities-idUSL1E8H757V
20120607.
248. Id.
249. Id.

314

[98:265

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
250

energy and commodities since the mid-1980s. In the early
1990s, Morgan Stanley’s oil trader, Olav Refvik, struck deals to
buy and deliver oil and oil products to large commercial users
around the globe and earned the nickname “King of New York
Harbor” for accumulating a record number of leases on storage
tanks at the key import hub, which gave the firm a great mar251
ket advantage. During the same period, Morgan Stanley constructed power plants in Georgia, Alabama and Nevada, which
252
allowed it to become a major electricity seller.
In the mid-2000s, Morgan Stanley began aggressively expanding its energy infrastructure investments, especially in oil
and gas transportation and logistics. In 2006, Morgan Stanley
acquired full ownership of Heidmar Inc., a Connecticut-based
253
global operator of commercial oil tankers. Although Morgan
Stanley sold fifty-one percent of equity in 2008, it still retained
254
a forty-nine percent stake. Heidmar operates a fleet of more
than 100 double-hull vessels and provides transportation and
255
logistics services to major oil companies around the world.
In September 2006, Morgan Stanley acquired, in a leveraged buyout, the full ownership of TransMontaigne Inc., a
Denver-based oil-products transportation and distribution
256
company.
TransMontaigne markets “unbranded gasoline,
diesel fuel, heating oil, marine fuels, jet fuels, crude oil, residu257
al fuel oils, asphalt, chemicals and fertilizers.” The company
is affiliated with a fuel terminal facility operator, TransMontaigne Partners L.P., which operates oil terminals in twenty258
seven U.S. states and Canada. In 2005, the last year TransMontaigne was a publicly-listed company, it reported revenues
of about $8.6 billion and assets of slightly less than $1.2 bil-

250. Ann Davis, Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In
Barrels, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2005, at A1.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Company History, HEIDMAR, http://www.heidmar.com/history (last
visited Oct. 9, 2013).
254. Id.
255. What We Do: Commercial Management, HEIDMAR, http://www
.heidmar.com/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
256. TRANSMONTAIGNE PARTNERS L.P., 1,750,000 COMMON UNITS REPRESENTING LIMITED PARTNER INTERESTS S-2 (Prospectus Supp. 2010).
257. About TMG, TRANSMONTAIGNE, http://www.transmontaigne.com/
about-tmg (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
258. TransMontaigne is the general partner of TransMontaigne Partners
L.P., a publicly-traded Delaware limited partnership. Id.
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259

lion. Forbes estimated the company’s 2011 revenues at $12
260
billion.
Both Heidmar and TransMontaigne are subsidiaries of
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (MS Capital Group), Morgan Stanley’s commodities and energy trading arm through
which it holds equity stakes in multiple commodity business261
es. According to Morgan Stanley’s own description of its physical commodities business activities in its SEC filings:
In connection with the commodities activities in our Institutional
Securities business segment, we engage in the production, storage,
transportation, marketing and trading of several commodities, including metals (base and precious), agricultural products, crude oil, oil
products, natural gas, electric power, emission credits, coal, freight,
liquefied natural gas and related products and indices. In addition,
we are an electricity power marketer in the U.S. and own electricity
generating facilities in the U.S. and Europe; we own TransMontaigne
Inc. and its subsidiaries, a group of companies operating in the refined petroleum products marketing and distribution business; and
we own a minority interest in Heidmar Holdings LLC, which owns a
group of companies that provide international marine transportation
262
and U.S. marine logistics services.

The SEC filings of TransMontaigne Partners, the only publicly-traded subsidiary of MS Capital Group and TransMontaigne, provide a fascinatingly detailed picture of one significant facet of Morgan Stanley’s physical commodities business:
263
“oil terminaling and transportation.” TransMontaigne Partners owns and operates a vast infrastructure, including numerous crude oil and refined products pipelines and terminals
along the Gulf Coast, in the Midwest, in Texas, along the Mis264
sissippi and Ohio Rivers, and in the Southeast. The company
receives refined oil products and liquefied natural gas from customers via marine vessels, ground transportation, or pipelines;
stores customers’ products in its tanks located at the terminals;
monitors the volume of stored products in its tanks; provides
259. See Fortune 500 2006, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune500/snapshots/1452.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (ranking
America’s largest corporations).
260. #21 TransMontaigne, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/21/
private-companies-11_TransMontaigne_7I0O.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013)
(excluding the revenues generated by the company’s publicly-traded subsidiaries).
261. Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K, supra note 135, at exh. 21.
262. Id. at 27.
263. TransMontaigne Partners L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10–11
(Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter TransMontaigne Partners, Form 10-K].
264. Id. at 12–19.
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product heating and mixing services; and transports the refined
265
products out of its terminals for further distribution.
In 2011, TransMontaigne Partners earned over $152 million in revenues, of which almost $107 million came from its af266
filiates. The company’s primary customers are its indirect
267
parent entities, MS Capital Group and TransMontaigne. This
is how the company’s latest annual report describes the business activities of MS Capital Group:
Morgan Stanley Capital Group is a leading global commodity
trader involved in proprietary and counterparty-driven trading in
numerous commodities markets including crude oil and refined products, natural gas and natural gas liquids, coal, electric power, base
and precious metals and others. Morgan Stanley Capital Group has
been actively trading crude oil and refined products for over 20 years
and on a daily basis trades millions of barrels of physical crude oil
and refined products and exchange-traded and over-the-counter crude
oil and refined product derivative instruments. Morgan Stanley Capital Group also invests as principal in acquisitions that complement
Morgan Stanley’s commodity trading activities. Morgan Stanley Capital Group has substantial strategic long-term storage capacity located
on all three coasts of the United States, in Northwest Europe and
268
Asia.

TransMontaigne Partners’ SEC filings offer a rare glimpse
into Morgan Stanley’s sprawling network of assets and activities in the energy sector. Ownership of critical infrastructure
assets—including terminals, pipelines, and marine vessels—
greatly facilitates Morgan Stanley’s trading of energy and

265. Id. at 12–13.
266. TransMontaigne Partners L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 73
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/00010
4746912005319/a2208753z10-ka.htm#aa3.
267. TransMontaigne Partners, Form 10-K, supra note 263, at 18.
268. Id. The report describes TransMontaigne’s own business operations as
follows:
TransMontaigne Inc. is a terminaling, distribution and marketing
company that markets refined petroleum products to wholesalers, distributors and industrial and commercial end users throughout the
United States, primarily in the Gulf Coast, Northeast, Southeast and
Midwest regions. TransMontaigne Inc. also owns a 100% interest in
TransMontaigne Canada Holdings, Inc., a Canadian petroleum marketing and terminaling company. As of December 31, 2011, TransMontaigne Inc. owned three refined product terminals; one dry bulk
product terminal; three railcar facilities; a hydrant system in Port
Everglades; and its distribution and marketing business. TransMontaigne Inc.'s marketing operations generally consist of the distribution and marketing of refined products through contract and rack spot
sales in the physical markets.
Id.
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commodities, in both physical and derivatives markets. At
the same time, such a direct and active involvement in the
business of oil and gas processing, storage, and transportation
creates significant risks for Morgan Stanley. Global energy
prices are notoriously volatile and depend on a complex interplay of various factors, including geopolitical ones. More importantly, however, these activities expose the firm to potential
legal liability, financial loss, and reputational damage in the
event of industrial accidents, oil spills, explosions, terrorist
acts, or other catastrophic events that cause serious environ270
mental harms. It is difficult to quantify the extent of this
risk, especially in the case of potential large-scale environmental disaster, but it is not difficult to imagine that it may be potentially fatal even for a large company with a formidable balance sheet. For a financial institution whose main business
depends greatly on its reputation and market perceptions of the
quality of its credit, even a remote risk of such an event may be
too much to live with. Morgan Stanley’s public disclosure of this
particular risk factor is carefully crafted and perfectly understated:
269. In July 2011, TransMontaigne Partners entered into an agreement for
construction and operation of a new crude oil storage facility in Cushing, Oklahoma, the major delivery hub and price settlement point for the benchmark
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude. Id. at 14. MS Capital Group’s access to
this strategically located facility is likely to give it significant additional advantage in trading oil futures and OTC derivatives referencing WTI. Id. The
company’s public filings stated:
We will lease a portion of land in Cushing, OK and construct storage
tanks and associated infrastructure on that property for the receipt of
crude oil by truck and pipeline, the blending of crude oil and the storage of 1.0 million barrels of crude oil. We have entered into a longterm services agreement with Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. for
the use of the facility.
Id.
270. According to Morgan Stanley’s own description of the risk factors specific to its physical commodities business in its annual report:
As a result of these activities, we are subject to extensive and evolving
energy, commodities, environmental, health and safety and other
governmental laws and regulations. In addition, liability may be incurred without regard to fault under certain environmental laws and
regulations for the remediation of contaminated areas. Further,
through these activities we are exposed to regulatory, physical and
certain indirect risks associated with climate change. Our commodities business also exposes us to the risk of unforeseen and catastrophic events, including natural disasters, leaks, spills, explosions,
release of toxic substances, fires, accidents on land and at sea, wars,
and terrorist attacks that could result in personal injuries, loss of life,
property damage, and suspension of operations.
Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K, supra note 135, at 27.
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Although we have attempted to mitigate our pollution and other
environmental risks by, among other measures, adopting appropriate
policies and procedures for power plant operations, monitoring the
quality of petroleum storage facilities and transport vessels and implementing emergency response programs, these actions may not
prove adequate to address every contingency. In addition, insurance
covering some of these risks may not be available, and the proceeds, if
any, from insurance recovery may not be adequate to cover liabilities
with respect to particular incidents. As a result, our financial condition, results of operations and cash flows may be adversely affected by
271
these events.

The business must be worth the risk.
2. Goldman Sachs: Metals, Warehouses, and Other Things
It is particularly difficult to develop a sufficiently full picture of the true nature and extent of Goldman’s involvement in
the production, processing, transportation, and marketing of
272
physical commodities.
Wall Street’s biggest commodities
dealer (by revenues), Goldman is “credited with attracting the
investors to the asset class with the creation of the Goldman
273
Sachs Commodity Index in 1991.” According to industry estimates, the firm’s commodities business—including derivatives and physical trading—generated annual revenues of $3–4

271. Id.
272. Unlike Morgan Stanley, Goldman does not appear to have publiclytraded subsidiaries engaged in physical commodities business, which eliminates the most lucrative source of reliable public information. In its SEC filings, Goldman provides only a brief description of commodities activities conducted by the firm’s Institutional Client Services segment. See Goldman Sachs
Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at 3. Intriguingly, however, Goldman also
reports proprietary, long-term investments in physical commodities assets in
another business segment, Investing and Lending:
Our other investments primarily include our consolidated investment entities, which are entities we hold for investment purposes
strictly for capital appreciation. These entities have a defined exit
strategy and are engaged in activities that are not closely related to
our principal businesses. We also invest directly in distressed assets,
currencies, commodities and other assets, including power generation
facilities.
Id. at 5. It appears that this business segment includes private equity investments held by Goldman under the merchant banking authority. It is not clear
whether the commodities and power generation facilities mentioned in the last
sentence are held as the same kind of passive private equity investments. It
does not appear that the value of these commodity assets is included in the
reported market value of commodities in the firm’s trading inventory.
273. Jack Farchy, Goldman and Clive Capital to Launch Commodities Index, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/acedcabe
-9514-11e0-a648-00144feab49a.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.
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billion between 2006 and 2008.
Goldman’s commodities trading business goes back to at
least 1981, when the firm bought its principal commodities
trading subsidiary, J. Aron & Co., which originally specialized
mostly in trading futures and options on precious metals and
275
coffee. In the 1980s–90s, Goldman focused primarily on client-driven financial transactions in commodities and built a
dominant position in the energy futures and OTC derivatives
markets. In the first decade of this century, however, Goldman
“has also been expanding into physical commodities, with ventures into coal and shipping trading, and a bigger presence in
276
physical metals such as aluminum.”
For example, in early 2005, the press reported that Gold277
man had “recently bought 30 electricity-generating plants.”
At least in part, this may have been a reference to Goldman’s
2003 acquisition of Cogentrix Energy LLC, a major power pro278
ducer based in Charlotte, North Carolina.
At the time,
Cogentrix owned and operated 26 coal- and natural gas-fired
279
power plants.
During the same period, Goldman reportedly made significant acquisitions in the oil and gas sector, including a significant stake in Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI), a major oil transportation and terminaling company that was recently reported to
control approximately 37,000 miles of pipelines and 180 terminals handling crude oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum

274. Blas, Commodities Trading Loses, supra note 242.
275. J. Aron & Co. Reduces Staff, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1983, http://www
.nytimes.com/1983/08/19/business/j-aron-co-reduces-staff.html. Both Goldman’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein and President Gary Cohn started their careers at
J. Aron & Co.
276. Blas, Commodities Trading Loses, supra note 242.
277. Davis, supra note 250.
278. Goldman to Sell Power Plant Unit to Carlyle, REUTERS, Sept. 7, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/07/cogentrixenergy-carlyle
-idUSL4E8K73S320120907.
279. Ryan Dezember, Carlyle to Acquire Cogentrix from Goldman, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044381940
4577636172770944192.html. According to media, “Goldman sold off most of
those plants—and built and sold others—during the last decade as Cogentrix
transformed into more of a developer of power plants.” Id. In September 2012,
Goldman reportedly agreed to sell Cogentrix to a private equity firm, Carlyle
Group L.P., on undisclosed terms. Id.; see also Ben Protess, Carlyle Buys Power Plants from Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/carlyle-buys-power-plants-from-goldman/?
pagewanted=print.
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280

products. According to KMI’s SEC filings, at the end of 2011,
281
Goldman owned 19.1% of the company’s common stock. In
addition, the report listed each of the two managing directors of
Goldman who also served on KMI’s board of directors as hold282
ers of 19.1% of the company’s common stock. It appears that
Goldman has similarly structured private equity investments
in other energy companies, including Cobalt International Energy Inc. (CIE), a Houston-based deep-water oil exploration and
283
production company.
Even after becoming an FHC subject to the activities restrictions of the BHCA and the consolidated supervision by the
Board, Goldman continued to acquire significant hard assets in
the commodities sector. For instance, in May 2012, the Financial Times reported that Goldman made a $407 million deal
with Brazil’s Vale, to acquire full ownership of Vale’s Colombian coal assets, including the El Hatillo coal mine, Cerro Largo
coal deposit, and a coal port facility on Colombia’s Atlantic

280. Kinder Morgan, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Feb. 22, 2012).
In investing in KMI, Goldman was joined by two private equity partners, The
Carlyle Group (Carlyle) and Riverstone Holdings LLC (Riverstone). Press Release, The Carlyle Grp., Management Grp. and Inv. Partners Propose to Take
Kinder Morgan, Inc. “Private” at $100 Per Share (May 28, 2006), available at
https://carlyle.com/news-room/news-release-archive/management-group-and
-investment-partners-propose-take-kinder-morgan-inc-pr.
281. Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at 121–22. Goldman
held this aggregate equity stake through several controlled funds, which
means that only a part of this investment was made with the firm’s own capital, alongside its clients’ money. Id. at 122.
282. Id. at 122. It is difficult to ascertain whether and to what extent this
ownership structure and board membership gave Goldman effective control
over KMI’s management and operations. Nevertheless, it is a plausible view of
the arrangement. It is particularly noteworthy that one of these two individuals on KMI’s board of directors, Henry Cornell, was the Chief Operating Officer of Goldman’s Merchant Banking division, while the other, Kenneth
Pontarelli, was a managing director in the same division. Id. at 103–04. Thus,
it appears that, for regulatory purposes, Goldman treated its investment in
KMI as a merchant banking investment permissible to FHCs under the
BHCA. In the context of Goldman’s overall commodities trading business,
however, one may legitimately question whether Goldman’s stake in KMI was
truly a passive, purely financial investment made solely for the purpose of reselling it at a profit.
283. Goldman holds a common equity stake in CIE through several controlled funds, and two of its managing directors in the merchant banking division serve on CIE’s board. Cobalt Int’l Energy Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A), at 10–17 (Mar. 22, 2012). The firm originally invested in CIE in partnership with Carlyle and Riverstone. Cobalt Int’l Energy Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 108 (Feb. 21, 2012).
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284

coast. In addition, the deal included an 8.43% equity stake in
285
the railway connecting the coal mines to the port. In addition
to increasing Goldman’s coal mining capacity, the deal was
meant to improve access to the port and railway for its existing
286
mines.
Goldman owns and operates its coal mining assets in Colombia through a local subsidiary, Colombian Natural Re287
sources. The firm holds its interest in Colombian Natural Resources indirectly, through another wholly-owned subsidiary,
288
GS Power Holdings LLC. GS Power Holdings also holds another prized asset in Goldman’s commodities empire: Metro In289
ternational Trade Services LLC (Metro).
Metro is a metals warehousing company that owns and operates nineteen warehouses in the Detroit metropolitan area,
290
as well as warehousing facilities in Europe and Asia. By acquiring Metro in February 2010, Goldman gained control of one
of the largest metals warehouses in the global network of stor291
age facilities approved by the LME. This acquisition strategically positioned the firm in the middle of the global metals
trading chain. Storing large quantities of metal generates lucrative rental income for warehousing companies like Metro.
The warehousing business is particularly profitable during
economic downturns when slackening demand forces producers
292
to hold more of their commodity inventories in storage. Not
surprisingly, Goldman was not the only commodity trader that
rushed to acquire large LME-approved warehouses in the wake
293
of the global financial crisis. The recent entry of financial in284. Joe Leahy, Goldman in Deal to Buy Vale’s Coal Assets, FIN. TIMES,
May 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c23288d0-a8e4-11e1-be59-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at exh. 21.1.
289. Id.
290. Walsh, supra note 2.
291. Trefis Team, Metal Warehousing Pays Off for Goldman Sachs,
FORBES, July 8, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/07/
08/metal-warehousing-pays-off-for-goldman-sachs/print.
292. Javier Blas, Goldman and JPMorgan Enter Metal Warehousing, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.
293. Glencore bought metals warehousing assets of Italy-based Pacorini
Group, while JPMC acquired the UK-based Henry Bath as part of its purchase
of RBS Sempra’s commodities assets. Tatyana Shumski & Andrea Hotter,
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stitutions effectively turned this traditionally low-profile industry run by dispersed independent operators into yet “another
294
arm of Wall Street.”
This transformation has caused serious turbulence in the
global market for aluminum, the second most widely-used met295
al in the world after steel. Aluminum producers store their
metal in LME-approved warehouses and then sell their metal
to industrial users. The buyers claim their purchased quantities of aluminum from the warehouse, which must deliver it to
296
the specific buyer. Ownership of the key LME warehouses by
large commodity traders with integrated financial and physical
metals operations allows them to control the supply of alumi297
num to commercial users and, as a result, to control prices.
This led other market participants to worry about unfair advantages for such firms, as they now can use their knowledge of
how much metal is stored, as well as their ability to control delivery of physical metal to consumers, to determine their own
298
trading strategies.
Wall Street Gets Eyed in Metal Squeeze, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2011, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304186404576389680225394642
.html.
294. Id.
295. Jack Farchy, Banks Force Aluminium Market Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3b3e02e-fcf3-11e1-a4f2-00144fe
abdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.
The arrival of investment banks in the aluminium market has
triggered a shake-up in the $100bn industry that is forcing producers
from Alcoa to Rusal and consumers such as BMW and Coca-Cola to
change the way they do business. The increasingly dominant role of
banks including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank—as
well as traders such as Glencore—has prompted a surge to record levels in the premium consumers pay for metal over the benchmark price
set at the London Metal Exchange.
Id.
296. See Shumsky & Hotter, supra note 293. The LME rules set the minimum delivery rates for its warehouses. If the demand for delivery of aluminum out of a particular warehouse significantly exceeds the rate at which the
warehousing company actually releases it, the resulting bottleneck prevents
the industrial users of aluminum from getting their purchased metal. Id.
297. Financial institutions like Goldman Sachs can also use their warehouses to store vast quantities of physical metals in so-called “financing”
deals. This strategy allows financial institutions to secure a guaranteed return. Removing a large portion of physical metal from the market, however,
creates artificial shortages of aluminum for commercial purchase and inflates
its market price. See Farchy, supra note 295. To take full advantage of these
opportunities, financial institutions that own large warehouses often offer
monetary incentives to producers who store their metal in their facilities. Id.
298. Andrea Hotter, LME Doubles Minimum Metal Deliveries in Detroit,
WALL ST. J., July 15, 2011, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lme-doubles

2013]

MERCHANTS OF WALL STREET

323

Goldman and its subsidiary Metro became the key figures
in a recent ugly battle over global aluminum prices. In mid2011, Metro reportedly stored nearly a half of the global inven299
tories of the industrial aluminum. Months-long delivery delays at the firm’s storage facilities in Detroit caused much discontent among big commercial users of aluminum, such as the
soft-drink giant Coca-Cola and the aluminum sheet-maker
300
Novelis. In mid-2011, Coca-Cola filed a complaint with the
LME alleging that Goldman intentionally limited the releases
of aluminum from its Metro-operated warehouses in order to
301
inflate the price of aluminum. In addition to potentially enabling Goldman to sell its own aluminum at artificially inflated
prices, holding aluminum in the warehouse generates additional fees for Metro, as the buyers have to pay for each day their
302
purchased metal stays in the warehouse.
In response to these complaints, the LME doubled the min303
imum delivery rates for large warehouses, including Metro.
Nevertheless, warehousing bottlenecks and record-high aluminum premiums continued to wreak havoc in global aluminum
304
305
markets throughout 2012 and 2013. By mid-2013, the re-minimum-metal-deliveries-in-detroit-2011-07-15/print?guid=C5A329C8
-0E58-4AA7-AA2C-72ADCFA5AE65.
299. See Trefis Team, supra note 291; see also Pratima Desai et al., Goldman’s New Money Machine: Warehouses, REUTERS, July 29, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE76R3YZ20110729
(stating
that, in the first six months of 2011, “Metro warehouses in Detroit took in
364,175 tonnes of aluminum and delivered out 171,350 tonnes [which] represented 42 percent of inventory arrivals globally and 26 percent of the metal
delivered out”).
300. See Shumsky & Hotter, supra note 293.
301. Coca-Cola alleged that it had to wait for seven months for Metro to
release its aluminum. See Walsh, supra note 290.
302. See Desai et al., supra note 299; Trefis Team, supra note 291.
Goldman charges 42 cents to store a metric ton of aluminum in its
facilities for a day, which translates into $150 in annual revenues for
every metric ton it stores. With millions of tons in storage, the industry is expected to rake in $1 billion in storage revenues each year.
Goldman Sachs which is estimated to hold 900,000 tons in its facilities can make $138 million in revenues from its storage business
alone.
Trefis Team, supra note 291.
303. See Hotter, supra note 298 (explaining that under the new LME rule,
beginning in April 2012, Metro had to deliver out at least 3,000 metric tons of
aluminum daily).
304. See Jack Farchy, Aluminium Market’s Premium Problem, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c04c50f6-fdc5-11e1-8fc3-00144fe
abdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk (“Japanese premiums for the fourth quarter are
settling at about $255 a tonne—more than double the level of six months
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ported waiting time for aluminum in Detroit was longer than
306
460 days. In July 2013, the LME’s new leadership proposed
another change to its rules to require warehouses experiencing
307
logjams to deliver out more metal than they take in. The new
rule, however, is expected to become effective only starting in
April 2014, which means continuing supply-chain disruptions
308
and inflated prices for nearly another year. Not surprisingly,
Goldman remains the key target of wholesale aluminum con309
sumers’ anger.
B. THE RISE OF JPMC: HOW NOT TO WASTE A CRISIS
Unlike Morgan Stanley and Goldman, JPMC has always
been a regulated BHC subject to activity restrictions. In 2005,
JPMC received the Board’s approval to trade physical commodities as an activity “complementary” to its commodity deriva310
tives business.
Under the terms of the Board’s approval,
however, JPMC did not have legal authority to “own, operate,
or invest in [any physical assets or] facilities for the extraction,
311
transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities.” These conditions reflected the Board’s judgment with respect to the
outer boundaries of FHC-permissible involvement in these
312
purely commercial activities. In effect, the Board’s decisions
permit FHCs like JPMC to own hard assets in the physical
commodities marketing chain, only as passive merchant bankago—and producers and traders are talking about premiums of $320–$330 a
tonne for European metal for the first quarter of next year.”).
305. Jack Farchy, HKEx’s LME Warehousing Conundrum, FIN. TIMES,
June 10, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3fad0594-d10f-11e2-a3ea-00144
feab7de.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.
306. Laura Clarke & Matt Day, New Stab at Metals Gridlock, WALL ST. J.,
July 2, 2013, at C4.
307. Id.; see also Jack Farchy, LME Takes Aim at Warehousing Queues,
FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5988476c-e235-11e2
-a7fa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.
308. Clarke & Day, supra note 306, at C1.
309. Farchy, Aluminium Market’s, supra note 304. Aluminum end-users’
complaints could potentially translate into legal action against the firm on antitrust grounds. In the fall of 2012, newspapers quoted Bob Bernstein, a New
York lawyer representing commodities consumers, as saying that the dominant position of Goldman’s warehousing subsidiary in LME’s Detroit hub
“naturally raises concerns about competition and the monopoly rents that are
being charged.” Id. This Article does not purport to assess the merits of any
such claim.
310. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
311. See id.
312. See supra Part II.
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ing investments.
The financial crisis became the key turning point for
JPMC, which emerged from it significantly larger and even
more systemically important than it had been before the crisis.
In 2008, JPMC bought, at a steep discount, the key assets of
Bear Stearns, an independent investment bank on the verge of
313
failure. As part of the deal, JPMC acquired commodity trading assets and operations, including a significant network of
electric power generating facilities owned by Arroyo Energy Investors L.P. (Arroyo), a commodities subsidiary of Bear
314
Stearns.
After acquiring Bear’s energy assets, JPMC’s CEO Jamie
Dimon and the head of commodities operations Blythe Masters
began aggressively expanding the firm’s physical commodities
315
business. In 2008, the firm started trading physical oil and
looking at “more ways to boost its presence in energy mar316
kets.” In addition to hiring more people in its commodities
and energy trading and investment team, JPMC started drawing plans for strategically expanding its metals and energy op317
erations in Asia.
JPMC’s once-in-a-lifetime chance to become a major player
in commodities came in late 2009, when the European Com318
mission ordered nationalized RBS to divest its riskier assets,
313. Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens
Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1.
314. See id.; Linette Lopez, How the Financial Crisis Helped Turn Big
Banks into Global Commodities Kings, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:25 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/banks-got-big-in-commodities-in-financial
-crisis-2013-8. Arroyo reportedly bought seventeen power projects, with a total
of 1,217 gross MW, from Delta Power Company LLC in January 2007. Arroyo
Energy Completes Buy of Delta Power Co., REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2007, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/25/utilities-arroyo-bearstearns-idUS
N2519863620070125. In September 2010, Arroyo acquired a 100% stake in
Triton combined cycle facility in Michigan, operated by KMI. Arroyo Energy to
Acquire 100% Stake in Triton Combined Cycle Facility from CIT Group,
RESEARCHVIEWS (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.researchviews.com/energy/power/
DealReport.aspx?sector=Power&DealID=145576.
315. See David Sheppard, JPMorgan’s Chief Oil Analyst Leaves Firm,
REUTERS, May 31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/
31/jpmorgan-eagles-departs-idUSL1E8GVJW020120531.
316. Sambit Mohanty, JPMorgan to Start Physical Oil Trade, Eyes $200
Oil, REUTERS, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/
05/14/us-jpmorgan-commodities-idUSSP14850120080514.
317. See id.
318. See Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Comm’n Approves
Impaired Asset Relief Measure and Restructuring Plan of Royal Bank of Scotland (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13
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including its fifty-one percent stake in RBS Sempra, a large
319
U.S. commodities and energy trading company. In July 2010,
JPMC bought RBS Sempra’s global oil, global metals, and Eu320
ropean power and gas businesses. In addition to bringing in
approximately $1.7 billion of net assets, the $1.6 billion acquisition nearly doubled the number of clients JPMC’s commodities business could serve and enabled the firm “to offer clients
321
more products in more regions of the world.”
In November 2010, JPMC also bought RBS Sempra’s North
American power and gas business, which added further
strength to the operations the firm inherited from Bear
322
Stearns. This purchase propelled JPMC into the top tier of
323
natural gas and power marketers in North America. Several
months after closing the deal, the firm boasted having control
of “a diverse network of physical assets, including 70 billion cubic feet per day of storage capacity—an increase of almost
100% since the purchase—and almost double the transport ca324
pacity it had previously.”
By late 2010, JPMC had emerged as a formidable contender for the title of dominant Wall Street energy and commodities
-788_en.htm.
319. RBS Sempra was a joint venture between RBS and Sempra Energy.
See Aldrick, supra note 197. RBS paid $1.35 billion for its 51% stake in the
company. See Sharlene Goff & Javier Blas, Suitors Line Up for RBS’s Sempra
Stake, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d587886-e509
-11de-9a25-00144feab49a.html#axzz2d2Z8hI3N.
320. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 184 (Feb.
28, 2012), available at http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/secfiling
.cfm?filingID=950123-11-19773 [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Form
10-K].
321. Id.; see Press Release, J.P. Morgan, J.P. Morgan Completes Commodities Acquisition from RBS Sempra (July 1, 2010), available at http://www
.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM_redesign/JPM_Content_C/Generic_
Detail_Page_Template&cid=1277505237241.
322. See Energy Risk Names J.P. Morgan “Oil & Products House of the
Year,” J.P.MORGAN (July 1, 2011), http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?
pagename=JPM_redesign/JPM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&
cid=1309472621690&c=JPM_Content_C. Sempra’s trading portfolio included
“physical and financial gas and power transactions and access to pipelines and
gas storage facilities.” Gregory Meyer, JPMorgan Buys RBS Sempra Commodities’ Trading Book, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
ed83952e-d24e-11df-8fbe-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2d2Z8hI3N. Nearly 750
counterparties to these trades included “gas producers, power plants, utilities
and governments.” Id.
323. See id. (“In the second quarter [of 2010], RBS Sempra ranked the fifthlargest North American gas marketer by volume, after BP, Royal Dutch Shell,
Conoco-Phillips and Macquarie, according to Platts. JPMorgan was 12th.”).
324. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 322.
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trading house, previously shared by Morgan Stanley and
325
Goldman. The firm conducts most of its physical energy and
commodity activities through a wholly-owned subsidiary, J.P.
326
Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation. JPMC’s official website describes the firm as one of the leading energy marketmakers in the world:
We are active in both the physical and financial markets worldwide
for crude oil and oil-refined products, coal, power and gas, and have
extensive capabilities in the voluntary and mandatory emissions
markets.
. . . Our geographically diverse physical asset portfolio includes more
than 40 North American locations. In addition, we are one of the largest natural gas traders in the U.K. and European markets, with daily
327
volumes of approximately 100 million therms.

In addition to oil, gas, and electric power assets, JPMC’s crisisdriven acquisitions allowed the firm to become a significant
force in global markets for metals. In late 2011, JPMC bought a
stake in LME from the bankrupt futures firm, MF Global, and
328
became the exchange’s largest shareholder. As part of its
Sempra deal, JPMC acquired control of Henry Bath, a UKbased metals warehousing company that owns and operates
one of the largest LME-approved global metal storage net329
works. According to the company’s own description:
Today, Henry Bath, a subsidiary of JP Morgan, engages in the
storage and shipping of exchange traded metals and soft commodities.
It offers warehousing, shipping transportation and customs clearance
services. The company stores and issues exchange traded warrants
for commodities, including aluminium, copper zinc, lead, nickel, tin,

325. See CNBC, supra note 229.
326. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K, supra note 320, at 329–30; J.P.
Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation: Private Company Information—
Businessweek, BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=28404895 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
327. Energy Commodities Trading, J.P.MORGAN, http://www.jpmorgan
.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities/energy (last visited Oct.
9, 2013).
328. Mark Scott & Michael J. de la Merced, JPMorgan Said to Buy MF
Global Stake in London Metal Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/jpmorgan-said-to-buy-mf-global-stake-in
-london-metal-exchange/?_r=1.
329. See Mike Jackson, Henry Bath & Son: A Company and Family History, HENRY BATH, http://www.henrybath.com/assets/_files/documents/jun_11/
HENRYBATH__1308588481_Complete_Henry_Bath_History.pdf (last updated June, 2011) (discussing how, because Henry Bath has extended its storage
space in America, it is “recognized as one of the dominant warehouses for the
London Metal Exchange”); Desai et al., supra note 299. Curiously, Henry Bath
was at one time owned by Enron. Id.
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Recent media reports indicate that JPMC has been building up its metals warehousing business in order to strengthen
the competitive position of Henry Bath vis-à-vis Glencore’s
331
Pacorini and Goldman’s Metro. The reports of JPMC moving
large amounts of metal from other warehouses into its own
suggest that the firm may be rebuilding its stocks and consoli332
dating its warehousing business in key European locations.
This is likely to exacerbate the conflict within the aluminum
industry over the unprecedented degree of power that the largest warehousing companies like Henry Bath and Metro exercise
333
over global aluminum prices.
JPMC may be in a particularly sensitive situation because
of its controversial move to market the first exchange-traded
334
fund (ETF) backed by physical copper. JPMC has been reportedly buying up copper since 2010, in anticipation of its ETF
335
launch. The firm’s ability to remove from the market and
store in its own warehouses vast quantities of this critically
important metal potentially lends more credibility to the fears
of market cornering expressed by the opponents of JPMC’s ETF
336
plan. It makes it difficult for JPMC to maintain that trading
copper-backed ETF shares is not going to result in artificial in330. Jackson, supra note 329.
331. See, e.g., Josephine Mason & Susan Thomas, Exclusive: JP Morgan
Adds Muscle to Metals Warehousing Money, REUTERS, Feb. 1, 2012, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-metals-jpmorgan-idUSTRE81
019J20120201.
332. See id.
333. See id.; see also supra notes 290–309 and accompanying text.
334. See Jack Farchy, Copper ETF Plan Would “Wreak Havoc,” FIN. TIMES,
May 23, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7d32d4c-a4fb-11e1-b421-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz2d2ZhI3N. The SEC approved JPMC’s plan to market its
copper-backed ETF in December 2012. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68440, 2012 WL 656113 (Dec. 14, 2012), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2012/34-68440.pdf.
335. See Louise Armitstead & Rowena Mason, JP Morgan Revealed as
Mystery Trader That Bought £1bn-Worth of Copper on LME, TELEGRAPH, Dec.
4, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/8180304/JP
-Morgan-revealed-as-mystery-trader-that-bought-1bn-worth-of-copper-on-LME
.html. In April 2012, JPMC reportedly held thirty to forty percent of total copper positions on the LME. CESCO WEEK: Glencore, JP Morgan Hold Dominant Copper Position as Back Flares—Sources, METALBULLETIN (Apr. 18,
2012,
1:34
PM),
http://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3013578/CESCO
-WEEK-Glencore-JP-Morgan-hold-dominant-copper-positions-as-back-flares
-sources.html.
336. See Armitstead & Mason, supra note 335; see also Mason & Thomas,
supra note 331.
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337

flation of global copper prices.
JPMC’s newly acquired physical commodity and energy assets and operations, however, raise a more fundamental legal
question as to whether the firm has the statutory authority to
own such assets and to conduct such operations in the first
place. The Board’s original order authorizing JPMC’s physical
commodity trading did not allow JPMC to own or operate any
assets involved in generating, storing, transporting, or pro338
cessing commodities. In fact, even energy tolling and energy
management were outside of the scope of that original authori339
zation. As part of its Sempra acquisition, JPMC obtained the
Board’s approval to continue energy tolling, energy management, and long-term wholesale electricity supply activities of
340
RBS. Under the terms of the order, JPMC’s newly expanded
activities are subject to the requirements and conditions con341
tained in the original RBS Order.
It appears that JPMC generally conducts its physical
commodity operations subject to Board-imposed limitations.
According to the firm’s SEC filings, it entered into operating
leases for “premises and equipment” used partially for “energy342
related tolling service agreements.” JPMC also enters into
various forms of “supply and off-take” contracts with producers
343
and processors of commodities, such as oil refineries. These
contracts are functionally similar to energy management arrangements JPMC and other FHCs have with electric power
344
plants under the “complementary” authority grants. Thus, in
April 2012, business media reported that Delta Airlines was
337. See Jack Farchy, JPMorgan Flip Flops on Commodity ETFs, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a782c1c6-f772-11e1-ba54
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2d2Z8hI3N.
338. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text.
340. See Letter from Board to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (June 30, 2010)
[hereinafter JPMC Board Order].
341. See id.; see also RBS Order, supra note 196.
342. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K, supra note 320, at 289. This
probably reflects the general practice among FHCs engaged in physical commodity trading under the Board’s “complementary” orders. See supra Part
II.B.1. To avoid legally owning or operating any physical assets involved in the
marketing chain, JPMC probably enters into some form of a sale-and-leaseback contract, whereby an unaffiliated third party is the legal owner of the
physical facilities and operates those facilities under a lease agreement with
JPMC.
343. See Meyer, supra note 6.
344. See supra Part III.A.1.

330

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:265

planning to purchase Conoco’s idle Trainer oil refinery, in order
to lower its jet fuel costs, and that JPMC agreed to finance the
entire production process through a supply and off-take agree345
ment. Under the arrangement, JPMC would purchase and
pay for delivery of the crude for the refinery’s operation, sell the
jet fuel to Delta at a wholesale price, and then sell other refined
346
products on the open market. In July 2012, JPMC entered into a similar supply and off-take arrangement with the largest
oil refinery on the East Coast, owned and operated by Sunoco
347
and Carlyle. These transactions significantly reduce refineries’ working capital needs and offload the risk on JPMC, which
348
has far greater balance-sheet capacity. In effect, JPMC contractually replicates owning oil refineries without violating the
letter of the law.
Nevertheless, there are signs that the Board may feel
somewhat uneasy about at least some of JPMC’s recently acquired physical commodity operations. The 2010 JPMC Board
Order explicitly required JPMC to either divest or conform to
the requirements of the BHCA the activities of (1) “owning, investing in, or operating” commodity storage facilities, and (2)
making and taking physical delivery of metal concentrates and
other commodities not previously approved by the Board for
349
trading. The Board gave JPMC a time limit of two years after
the acquisition to comply with these commitments but reserved
350
a discretionary right to extend that grace period. In addition,
345. See, e.g., Kate Kelly, The Glue in Delta’s Possible Refinery Deal: JP
Morgan, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id47017435.
346. See id.
347. See Janet McGurty, Carlyle Saves Big Sunoco Refinery with Shale
Boom, JPMorgan, REUTERS, July 2, 2012, available at http://www.reuters
.com/article/2012/07/02/sunoco-carlyle-philadelphia-idUSL2E8I20OS20120702;
see also Sheppard & Alper, supra note 1.
348. See Meyer, supra note 6. According to Blythe Masters, the head of
JPMC’s global commodities unit, it is this “risk and balance sheet capacity”
that puts big banks in the unique position to do these supply and off-take
deals. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Non-bank commodity trading houses typically use about seventy-five to eighty percent of their credit
lines, which leaves them little room for taking on new deals, while still maintaining a comfortable cushion against sudden price rises. Id.
349. See JPMC Board Order, supra note 340. Because metal concentrate
futures were not traded on major organized commodity exchanges, the Board
excluded metal concentrates from the scope of its original order approving
RBS’s “complementary” activities. See RBS Order, supra note 196, at C67.
350. JPMC Board Order, supra note 340. Under the terms of the original
RBS Order, RBS committed to discontinue within two years its activities of
owning or investing in storage facilities for commodities that RBS was not
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the Board prohibited JPMC from expanding the scope of these
activities beyond those Sempra conducted immediately prior to
351
its acquisition by JPMC.
In April 2012, JPMC sold its metals-concentrate trading
352
unit to Connecticut-based Freepoint. The firm’s continuing
ownership and operation of Henry Bath, however, presents a
potential problem in this regard. As of this writing, JPMC has
not yet ceased its lucrative metal warehousing operations, even
though they may be inconsistent with the terms of the Board’s
353
“complementary” orders.
JPMC’s speedy rise to the top of the Wall Street commodity
trading circle has created new legal and reputational risks for
the firm. In the summer of 2012, the FERC launched an inves354
tigation into JPMC’s electric power trading practices. The
agency began its probe in response to complaints from electric
power grid operators in California and the Midwest in 2011, alleging that JPMC’s power traders had intentionally bid up
355
wholesale electricity prices by more than $73 million. Artificial inflation of wholesale prices benefits power generators
(which is functionally JPMC’s role) but translates into higher
356
power prices for households and other end-users. Moreover,
permitted to own or hold under the BHCA, as well as not to make or take
physical delivery of metal concentrates. See RBS Order, supra note 196, at
C67. Here, the Board restarted the clock for JPMC, giving it at least until mid2012 to comply with these requirements.
351. See JPMC Board Order, supra note 340.
352. Josephine Mason, Freepoint Agrees to Buy JPM’s Metal Concentrates
Business, REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/04/25/freepoint-jpm-concentrates-idUSL2E8FP0T320120425; Josephine
Mason, JPMorgan Poised to Sell U.S. Metal Concentrate Unit, REUTERS, Apr.
20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us-jpmorgan
-concentrates-idUSBRE83J1KS20120420. The sold unit excluded JPMC’s
physical copper and aluminum trading desks in London and Singapore. Josephine Mason, JPMorgan Poised to Sell U.S. Metal Concentrate Unit, REUTERS,
Apr. 20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us
-jpmorgan-concentrates-idUSBRE83J1KS20120420.
353. It is, of course, possible that the Board quietly exercised its discretion
to extend the two-year grace period, as provided in the JPMC Board Order,
supra note 340.
354. See Scott DiSavino & David Sheppard, JPMorgan Probed over Possible
Power Market Manipulation, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available at http://www
.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/us-utilities-jpmorgan-ferc-idUSBRE8620LK20
120703.
355. Id.
356. See id. This scenario brings back memories of the infamous California
power market manipulation scandal and the Enron failure in 2001. See generally Tapes: Enron Plotted to Shut Down Power Plant, CNN.COM (Feb. 3, 2005,
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as recent FERC enforcement actions demonstrate, the focus of
today’s fraud prevention in power markets is on more subtle
trading strategies that seek to manipulate the price of physical
power in order to increase the value of the manipulator’s finan357
cial bets. JPMC’s role as the leading global energy derivatives
358
dealer potentially exacerbates concern over the firm’s traders
359
engaging in this type of market manipulation.
Even in the absence of an admission of wrongdoing on the
part of JPMC, the very fact of FERC’s investigation and sanc360
tions raises uncomfortable questions about the potential impact of the firm’s newly-expanded energy operations on its
overall institutional culture and reputation. These concerns become particularly acute in the context of the infamous “London
Whale” scandal that exposed deep problems with JPMC’s risk
361
management practices. Both cases demonstrate the inherent
difficulty of drawing regulatory distinctions among various
transactions based on the firm’s intentions and proclaimed
business purposes. Just as a legitimate hedge can become a lucrative bet under favorable market conditions, so can financingand-risk-management arrangements with oil refineries and
power generators become a profitable proprietary business of
362
energy merchanting. How the law should deal with this complex reality is one of the key questions in today’s financial ser11:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/enron.tapes (discussing the Enron California power scandal).
357. See, e.g., DiSavino & Sheppard, supra note 354.
358. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
359. On September 20, 2012, FERC initiated an official proceeding accusing J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, JPMC’s commodity trading
arm, of intentionally providing misleading information to the regulator. News
Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, FERC Initiates Proceeding into Actions by JP Morgan (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/
2012/2012-3/09-20-12-E-24.asp.
360. JPMC ultimately settled this matter by agreeing to pay the FERC
$410 million in civil penalties, including $125 million in disgorgement of unjust profits, without admitting any wrongdoing. News Release, Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, FERC, JP Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers (July 20, 2013), available at http://www.ferc
.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.Ui1mRRZEO5d; see also
Brian Wingfield & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million in U.S.
FERC Settlement, BLOOMBERGLAW (July 30, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://about
.bloomberglaw.com/legal-news/jpmorgan-to-pay-410-million-in-u-s-ferc
-settlement.
361. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Suzanne Craig, JPMorgan
Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion.
362. See supra notes 314–27 and accompanying text.
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vices regulation reform.
IV. WHAT SAY WE? LEGAL, POLICY, AND THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the recent financial crisis has fundamentally altered the nature and scope
of large U.S. banking organizations’ involvement in physical
commodity and energy markets. This Part addresses legal, policy, and theoretical implications of this phenomenon.
This Part argues, first, that the BHCA does not provide a
clear and effective legal framework for making a fundamental
policy decision on the socially efficient degree of mixing banking and commercial commodities activities. It argues, further,
that there are important policy reasons why such mixing, at
least to the degree to which it is done today, may be socially
undesirable and inefficient. In addition to the traditional concerns underlying the original doctrine of separation of banking
and commerce, it may be especially critical to keep banks out of
the strategically important and complex markets for energy
and physical commodities for reasons of systemic risk prevention, regulatory efficiency, and the long-term governability of
financial institutions.
Finally, this Part argues that taking these policy concerns
seriously potentially necessitates extending the prohibition on
physical commodity and energy trading beyond banks and
BHCs to all SIFIs. In that sense, the recent transformation of
large U.S. financial institutions into global commodity dealers
raises not only urgent legal and policy issues but also fundamental theoretical questions about the nature, social functions,
and proper regulatory boundaries of modern financial intermediation. This Part concludes by outlining some of these theoretical issues for future research.
A. POST-CRISIS LEGAL PARADOXES: NEW GAME UNDER OLD
RULES, OR OLD GAME UNDER NEW RULES?
Even a cursory overview of publicly available information
shows that the current commodity operations of Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC defy carefully drawn pre-crisis regulatory boundaries of FHC-permissible physical commodities activities—and effectively nullify the principle of separating
banking from commerce. Broadly, there are two potential ways
to resolve this tension: either FHCs’ impermissible commercial
activities must be brought into compliance with the law, or the
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law should be changed to reflect FHCs’ newly acceptable role as
global commodity merchants.
1. The BHCA Solution: Definitely, Maybe
The BHCA does not provide a definitive framework for
making this fundamental choice. In fact, the statute is surprisingly vague on this issue.
The commodity grandfathering provision of section 4(o) of
the BHCA potentially provides the greatest latitude for Morgan
Stanley and Goldman, as two FHCs qualifying for this exemption, to continue owning and operating their extensive commod363
ity assets “and underlying physical properties.” Indeed, both
firms have publicly stated their intent to rely on this exemption
to keep their physical commodity operations even after becom364
ing subject to the BHCA activity restrictions. On its face, section 4(o) does not impose any qualitative limits on grandfathered activities: the language of the provision is broad and
365
open to expansive interpretation. Yet, as discussed above, the
legislative history of this grandfathering provision, originally
conceived as a special concession to “woofies”—financial institutions without access to FDIC-insured retail deposit-taking—
indicates that it was not designed to operate as a completely
open-ended commodity-business license for banking organiza366
tions. It is doubtful that, at the time the GLBA was passed,
Congress actually envisioned the current extent and depth of
367
these firms’ physical commodities operations. Ironically, the
very breadth of the grandfathering exemption in section 4(o) of
363. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2012).
364. Thus, Morgan Stanley provided this disclosure in its SEC filings:
We are engaged in discussions with the Federal Reserve regarding our commodities activities, as the BHC Act provides a grandfather
exemption for “activities related to the trading, sale or investment in
commodities and underlying physical properties,” provided that we
were engaged in “any of such activities as of September 30, 1997 in
the United States” and provided that certain other conditions that are
within our reasonable control are satisfied.
Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K, supra note 135, at 27. Goldman’s SEC filings also
expressed the firm’s confidence that it qualified for the section 4(o) exemption
when it stated “we are permitted under the GLB Act to continue to engage in
certain commodities activities in the United States that may otherwise be impermissible for bank holding companies, so long as the assets held pursuant to
these activities do not equal five percent or more of our consolidated assets.”
Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at 9.
365. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
366. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
367. See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text.
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the BHCA may actually render it less useful to Morgan Stanley
and Goldman in practice, as the Board may be more reluctant
to ratify such an open-ended expansion of FHCs’ commercial
368
commodities activities.
An even greater irony is that the commodity grandfathering provision was included in the GLBA as an inducement for
369
investment banks to become regulated FHCs. Yet, during the
2008 crisis, no additional incentives were necessary to induce
370
every surviving investment bank to seek BHC status. In the
wake of the crisis that changed the face of the industry, there
seems to be no plausible policy basis for this ambiguous and
remarkably broad commodity grandfathering provision.
In the alternative, Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC
can seek the Board’s approval of their existing commodities activities as complementary to FHC-permissible financial activities, such as commodity derivatives. As discussed above, the
BHCA does not define what “complementary” means and leaves
it largely to the Board’s discretion to determine whether any
371
particular activity fits that description. An examination of
published Board orders shows the regulator’s general reluctance to allow FHCs to incur non-financial risks associated
with owning and operating oil rigs, coal mines, refineries, stor372
age tanks, pipelines, and tankers. As is the case with any
agency policy, however, the Board’s position may change in response to various internal and external factors. Moreover, even
if the Board insists on its pre-crisis determination that “complementary” commodity trading activities exclude direct ownership and operation of physical assets, the practical impact of
368. Curiously, TransMontaigne Partners, an indirect oil transportation
and terminaling subsidiary of Morgan Stanley, disclosed in its SEC filings
that in October 2011 Morgan Stanley imposed a temporary moratorium on the
company’s “significant” asset acquisitions and investments, as a necessary
measure in light of the uncertain regulatory environment relating, in part, to
Morgan Stanley’s non-financial investments. See TransMontaigne Partners,
Form 10-K, supra note 263, at 34–35. This decision by Morgan Stanley may
have indicated the firm’s doubts regarding the availability of the grandfathering exemption for its oil and gas operations. According to recent media reports,
at least some Board officials are increasingly skeptical about Morgan Stanley’s
ownership of TransMontaigne. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & Liam Pleven, Wall
Street Is Rethinking Commodity-Trading Role, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2012, at
C1.
369. See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text.
370. See, e.g., supra note 228 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part I.B.2.
372. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 187.
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that seemingly bright-line border may be rather limited. FHCs
can (and do) use various forms of “sale and lease-back” or “supply and off-take” arrangements to replicate the effects of owning and operating individual key links in the commodity supply
373
chain.
Finally, FHCs can use merchant banking authority to
keep, and even expand, their current physical commodity as374
sets. Merchant banking is a potentially tempting choice because it can be used without the Board’s pre-approval: the FHC
can make the determination that it holds certain investments
375
under that statutory authority. As discussed above, FHCpermissible merchant banking investments must meet certain
statutory requirements intended to prevent FHCs from actively
running the commercial businesses of their portfolio compa376
377
nies. The holding period limitations and the prohibition on
FHCs’ involvement in “routinely managing” portfolio compa378
nies’ businesses seem tough in principle but are not neces379
sarily a “deal-breaker.” Large FHCs already invest in commodity and energy companies under the merchant banking
380
authority. It is not difficult to structure specific investments
to meet the formal statutory criteria without giving up real
control. It is difficult to ascertain, however, whether these investments are, in fact, truly passive private equity interests acquired purely for the purposes of profitable resale. In practice,
FHCs can—and most likely do—exercise informal influence on
portfolio companies’ business decisions, which may be just as
381
effective as a formal management role.
373. See supra Part I.B.2; supra note 342; see also supra notes 343–48 and
accompanying text. While these arrangements may potentially reduce direct
risks to individual FHCs’ safety and soundness, their proliferation implicates
other policy concerns the Board must consider in granting “complementary”
powers to FHCs: excessive concentration of market power, conflicts of interest,
and increased systemic risk. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; infra
Part IV.B.
374. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2012).
375. See id.
376. See supra Part I.B.1.
377. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text. Thus, Goldman reportedly structured its investment in Metro as a merchant banking investment. See Sheppard et al., supra note 25.
381. Goldman’s investment in KMI provides a good example. On its face, it
appears to be a bona fide merchant banking investment. Yet, even if Goldman
itself cannot formally participate in routinely managing KMI’s affairs, its long-
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Moreover, as discussed below, using merchant banking authority to invest in companies engaged in producing, transporting, and marketing physical commodities may become an increasingly attractive option for FHCs in the context of the
regulatory reform mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank
382
Act).
time co-investors and private equity deal partners, Carlyle and Riverstone, are
free to so participate. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text. It is not
difficult to imagine a situation in which Goldman’s non-FHC partners direct
KMI’s business in a manner consistent with Goldman’s business goals and
commodity trading strategy. Informal influence of this sort is difficult to detect
and prevent. KMI is engaged principally in the same lines of business as Morgan Stanley’s TransMontaigne subsidiaries that play a crucial role in Morgan
Stanley’s commodity-trading operations. See id.; supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text. If Goldman were to similarly use its stake in KMI to secure
access to KMI’s transportation and storage facilities in order to facilitate
Goldman Sachs’s commodity trading, its investment in KMI would not properly qualify for the merchant banking exemption. Yet, Goldman may be following the same pattern with respect to any portfolio company. Without more information, this is merely a plausible hypothesis. It shows, however, the
importance of subjecting FHCs’ merchant banking investments in commodity
and energy assets to closer scrutiny for compliance with the spirit, as well as
the letter, of the law.
382. See infra notes 397–99 and accompanying text.
It should be noted here that Goldman and Morgan Stanley potentially
have another option for keeping all of their existing commodities assets and
activities outside the prohibitions of section 4 of the BHCA. In theory, both of
these firms can surrender the bank charters of their deposit-taking subsidiaries and re-charter them as industrial banks or other institutions exempt from
the BHCA definition of a “bank.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2012). As a result of
this “de-banking,” Goldman and Morgan Stanley would lose their official BHC
status. Nevertheless, they will remain subject to extensive regulation and supervision by the Board as non-bank SIFIs. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113, 124 Stat. 1376,
1398–1402 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323) (authorizing the newly created
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate systemically important non-bank financial companies to be supervised by the Board under
heightened prudential standards) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; Dodd-Frank
Act § 117, 124 Stat. at 1403–06 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5324–25) (mandating
that a systemically important BHC will remain subject to the Board’s supervision and heightened prudential standards even if it ceases to own or control a
U.S. bank).
Surrendering their subsidiaries’ bank charters, therefore, is not likely
to make a significant difference in the overall regulatory burden on Goldman
and Morgan Stanley. Dodd-Frank Act § 115, 124 Stat. at 1406–08 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5326) (mandating enhanced prudential regulation of non-bank
SIFIs). Even though, as a technical matter, they will be free to conduct commercial activities without regard to the BHCA’s prohibitions, the Board and
FSOC will retain broad authority to monitor and regulate their activities in a
manner very similar to the regulation of BHCs. See id. It is not clear how the
regulators will exercise this authority in practice. Yet, if the regulators are
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2. The Discreet Charm of the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act, the most wide-ranging financial sector reform law since the Great Depression, mandates a wide
range of measures aimed at detecting and reducing systemic
383
risk. The practical efficacy of the Dodd-Frank Act, however,
depends on the final outcomes of the long and complicated implementation process. As of this writing, there is still much uncertainty as to its ultimate impact on financial intermediaries’
business practices.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act reiterated Congress’s general commitment to the principle of separation of banking and
384
commerce, the new law does not directly address the issue of
the proper scope of FHC-permissible non-financial activities. It
is not clear whether and how the regulatory implementation of
the Act will ultimately affect large FHCs’ physical commodities
operations. As Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and JPMC adapt
their business models to the evolving regulatory regime, their
individual choices are difficult to predict with any certainty.
The potential effect of the Volcker Rule on FHCs’ commodities trading, both in financial and physical markets, seems to
be an area of particular concern in this respect. The Volcker
Rule generally prohibits “banking entities” from proprietary
trading in financial instruments and from investing in private
385
equity and hedge funds. There is a great deal of uncertainty
as to whether the implementation of that rule would force
FHCs to reduce or even cease their proprietary trading activities in physical commodities. Although the statutory language
is vague and lacking in detail, it outlaws only short-term proprietary trading in financial instruments and not physical
386
commodities.
genuinely inclined to stop Goldman and Morgan Stanley from growing their
commodity-trading businesses, they should not encounter much difficulty in
using their statutory powers over non-bank SIFIs to achieve that goal. Thus,
as a practical matter, “de-banking” does not seem to be a viable exit option for
Goldman and Morgan Stanley, especially given the inescapably bad “optics” of
such a move.
383. See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.).
384. Dodd-Frank Act § 603(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1598–99 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1815).
385. Dodd-Frank Act § 619(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 1629 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1851) (defining “banking entities” as all federally-insured deposit-taking institutions and their affiliates).
386. Dodd-Frank Act § 619(h)(4), 124 Stat. at 1630 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1851). The statute defines “proprietary trading” as follows:
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It is not clear, however, whether commodity forwards, or
contracts for future delivery of physical commodities, are
properly classified as cash trades or financial instruments. In
October 2011, federal bank regulators published a proposed
387
rule that treated commodity forwards as financial contracts.
The purpose for this inclusion was to prevent large FHCs from
evading the Volcker Rule by shifting their proprietary trading
388
from derivatives to physical markets.
In response, large
FHCs began lobbying for an explicit exemption of commodity
389
forwards from the scope of the Volcker Rule. JPMC and Morgan Stanley submitted comments on the proposed rulemaking,
arguing that the Volcker Rule prohibitions threatened their
390
ability to engage in physical commodity trading.
Morgan
Stanley’s comment letter contained a particularly elaborate and
extensive argument that prohibitions on proprietary trading in
commodity derivatives would significantly limit the firm’s ability to conduct physical commodity operations, and that restrictions on the firm’s physical commodities activities would
391
greatly harm its customers. The letter used a jet fuel supply
agreement with an airline as an example of its “customerfacing” “market-making” transactions in commodities markets
that would be rendered impracticable or possibly illegal under
392
the agencies’ proposed rules.
The veracity of these claims must be assessed in the context of Morgan Stanley’s strategic efforts to minimize the scope
of the Volcker Rule restrictions on its ability to trade and deal
in financial instruments. As finally implemented, the Volcker
The term ‘proprietary trading’ . . . means engaging as a principal
for the trading account of the banking entity . . . in any transaction to
purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any
derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any
option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule . . . determine.

Id.
387. 76 Fed. Reg. 68,845 (Nov. 7, 2001).
388. See Sheppard & Alper, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Carl Levin).
389. See Sheppard & Alper, supra note 1.
390. See Letter from Barry L. Zubrow, Exec. Vice President, JPMorgan
Chase & Co., to Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Domestic Fin. et al. (Feb. 13,
2012), at 28–29; Letter from Simon T.W. Greenshields, Global Co-Head of
Commodities, Morgan Stanley, to Fed. Reserve Sys. et al. (Feb. 13, 2012),
[hereinafter MS Commodities Comment].
391. MS Commodities Comment, supra note 390.
392. Id. at 8.
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Rule may, in fact, make FHCs’ physical commodity trading operations more burdensome or less lucrative. Thus, in July 2012,
the media reported that Morgan Stanley was contemplating a
sale of a minority stake in its commodities unit, allegedly as a
393
preemptive move to comply with the Volcker Rule. These reports suggested that Morgan Stanley was seeking a non-bank
partner to take over the parts of the commodity trading business potentially affected by the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions on
394
proprietary trading. According to Morgan Stanley’s former
treasurer, however, it is likely that Morgan Stanley is simply
looking to recapitalize its commodities unit with outside equity
in order to raise its credit rating after Moody’s Investors Ser395
vice (Moody’s) downgraded the firm’s credit in June 2012.
In this connection, it is important not to underestimate financial institutions’ proven ability to engage in successful regulatory arbitrage to avoid constraints on their profit-making activities. Morgan Stanley’s characterization of its commercial
fuel logistics business as a “market-making” function, essentially indistinguishable from other forms of client-driven financial
intermediation, may signal one such sophisticated arbitrage
396
strategy. Large FHCs may also shift more of their physical
393. See, e.g., Christine Harper, Morgan Stanley May Sell CommoditiesUnit Stake to Fund, BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-07-20/morgan-stanley-may-sell-commodities-unit-stake-to
-fund.html (reporting Morgan Stanley’s talks with Blackstone Group and Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) as potential purchasers of a minority stake in
the firm’s commodity business).
394. Id.
395. Id. In October 2012, there were more reports of Morgan Stanley’s ongoing negotiations with QIA regarding potential sale of a majority stake in the
firm’s commodities unit. Tracy Alloway & Javier Blas, M Stanley in Talks over
Commodities Unit, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
0b2ee132-0d76-11e2-bfcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2eEZAEPXd.
396. MS Commodities Comment, supra note 390. Morgan Stanley’s comment letter prompted an MIT Professor John E. Parsons to post this comment
on his blog:
[M]organ Stanley’s jet fuel business provides a real service . . . It’s
just not market making in financial securities. One can imagine that
Morgan Stanley’s ability to offer jet fuel logistics services on favorable
terms benefits from the banks expert analysis of volatile petroleum
product prices, and also on its ability to trade in both the physical and
financial petroleum and petroleum product markets. But none of that
transforms the business into market making. There are plenty of nonbanks that provide exactly this kind of logistics services in all kinds of
commodities.
John E. Parsons & Antonio S. Mello, Morgan Stanley Says Potahto, BETTING
THE BUS. (Apr. 23, 2012, 6:13 AM), http://bettingthebusiness.com/2012/04/23/
morgan-stanley-says-potahto.
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commodities assets into their merchant banking divisions. Because the Volcker Rule targets only short-term trading activities for the banking entity’s own account, it does not apply to
397
long-term merchant banking investments. This potentially
creates a loophole in the new regulatory regime for FHCs wish398
ing to keep their commodities operations. It may be particularly difficult to detect and counteract this form of regulatory
arbitrage, because the key test for a bona fide merchant banking investment turns ultimately on the FHC’s intent—a notoriously elusive factor.
Trading, producing, storing, and moving physical commodities remains a strategically important business for large FHCs
like Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC. According to banks’
own statements, trading in physical markets is indispensable
399
to their commodity derivatives operations.
Not only does
physical trading give their derivatives traders an invaluable informational advantage but it also puts these firms in the center
of the strategically important and profitable markets for physi400
cal commodities and energy. In addition, it offers potential
397. Paul Volcker himself admitted that the rule named after him did not
explicitly target potentially unacceptable proprietary risk-taking by FHCs
through long-term merchant banking investments. See Tom Braithwaite,
Volcker Takes Aim at Long-Term Investments, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2a03c58c-242a-11e0-a89a-00144feab49a.html#
axzz2gX8IEQC5.
398. At this point, however, it is not clear whether holding commodity assets under the merchant banking authority would shield FHCs from the undesirable effects of the Volcker Rule. One potential problem under the Volcker
Rule is that it restricts FHCs’ ability to make merchant banking investments
through private equity funds. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124
Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1850a–1851). Since FHCs
typically make their merchant banking investments through funds, alongside
client money, this provision of the Volcker Rule may force FHCs to restructure
their merchant banking investments. Another potentially serious issue is
whether merchant banking portfolio companies—the FHC-controlled entities
that would actually conduct physical commodity trading—are themselves subject to the Volcker Rule as “banking entities.” See Letter from John F.W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, Goldman Sachs, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Feb. 13, 2012), at 16 (arguing that federal regulators should explicitly
exclude merchant banking portfolio companies from the definition of “banking
entity” under the Volcker Rule).
399. See Dmitry Zhdannikov, Banks Struggle to Adapt or Survive in Commodities, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/11/05/us-banks-commodities-idUSBRE8A40QC20121105.
400. Experts predict that global demand for oil, gas, and metals will continue to increase, in order to accommodate the growing needs of China and
other developing countries. See Guy Chazan, Renewables Will Widen Investor
Enthusiasm, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/975ae
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regulatory arbitrage opportunities for banking organizations
able to shift their risk-taking from the increasingly heavily
regulated derivatives into physical trades. It is unlikely, there401
fore, that these institutions will give it all up without a fight.
The stakes in this fight are high, not only for the financial
firms but for the general public as well. Whether systemically
important U.S. banking organizations should be allowed to continue their present activities in physical commodity and energy
markets—and thus render the principle of separating banking
from commerce effectively meaningless—is an important public
policy decision that requires careful and informed deliberation.
B. RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONAL MYTH: SHOULD POLICY
PERMIT BANKS TO BE COMMODITY MERCHANTS?
An examination of FHCs’ role in physical commodity mar8dc-a4ca-11e1-9a94-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2eEZAEPXd. Recent decisions by Germany and Japan to shut down their nuclear power facilities and move primarily to natural gas-fired power generation will further increase demand for liquefied natural gas, crude oil, and coal. See Jonathan
Soble & Javier Blas, Japan to Phase Out Nuclear Power, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9961e7c-fe3e-11e1-8228-00144feabdc0
.html.
401. Initial media reports on Morgan Stanley’s sale plans noted the firm’s
strong desire to retain the majority stake in its lucrative commodities business. Harper, supra note 393; Brett Philbin, Morgan Stanley Not Selling
Commodities Unit, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/morgan-stanley-not-selling-commodities-unit-2012-06-06. Goldman reportedly considered a potential spin-off of its commodities unit but decided
against it. See Lucchetti & Pleven, supra note 368 (quoting the firm’s statement that it “never seriously looked at” such a spin-off). Until mid-2013,
JPMC also denied having plans to divest its commodities operations.
Zhdannikov, supra note 399. In mid-2013, the media again reported on Morgan Stanley’s downsizing of commodities-trading personnel, as well as Goldman’s informal efforts to “sound out” potential buyers for Metro. Javier Blas,
Morgan Stanley Cuts Back Commodities Business, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af923c1e-d9b4-11e2-98fa-00144feab7de.html;
Clarke & Day, supra note 306.
As of this writing, however, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent,
or even whether, any of these reported moves signal these institutions’ retrenchment, temporary or permanent, from physical commodities. Strictly
speaking, divesting ownership of warehousing or pipeline-operating companies
does not preclude an FHC from trading physical commodities. Generally, individual firms’ decisions to grow or shrink their physical commodity operations
are driven by numerous considerations, including prevailing trends in commodity prices, shifts in these firms’ revenues and regulatory compliance costs,
political pressures, and even personal preferences of their top managers. As a
matter of principle, however, particular firms’ business decisions do not diminish the importance of developing a thoughtful and coherent policy basis for
regulating banking organizations’ physical commodity activities.
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kets raises fundamentally important issues not only of current
law but also of future doctrine and policy. Chief among them is
whether we should reassert the principle of separation of banking and commerce. As discussed above, the main reasons for
not mixing banking with general commerce have traditionally
included the needs to preserve the safety and soundness of the
federally-insured U.S. banking system, to ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to productive economic enterprise, and to
prevent excessive concentration of financial and economic power. Are these stated policy reasons behind the legal principle
still compelling today? What do the physical commodities activities of large U.S. FHCs reveal about the ongoing relevance and
validity of these policy objectives?
1. Safety and Soundness; Systemic Risk
From the perspective of safety and soundness of individual
banking organizations, there is at least one straightforward,
plausible argument for allowing FHCs to conduct physical
commodities trading as a diversification strategy. Diversifying
their business activities by investing in oil pipelines and metals
warehouses should make FHCs less vulnerable to periodic crises in financial markets. Trading, transporting, storing, and
processing physical commodities is a volatile business, and that
402
volatility is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. It
is a reliably profitable business, as global commodity prices
have been rising since the early 2000s and, despite sudden ups
and downs, are expected to continue rising in response to in403
creasing global demand. Intermediating physical commodities trading is the surest way to profit from these trends.
As professional intermediaries, financial institutions appear to be perfectly positioned to assume that lucrative role.
Large FHCs have huge balance sheets, access to cheaper financing, superior access to information and in-house research
capacity, and sophisticated financial derivatives trading capabilities. To the extent that utilizing these unique advantages
allows FHCs to be more efficient, low-cost suppliers of physical
commodities and related logistics services, allowing them to
perform that function should produce economic benefits for the

402. See Tony Levene, Commodity Prices: High-Flying Oil Kings, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/38330322-f8f7-11e1-8d92
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2eEZAEPXd.
403. Id.
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404

FHCs and their customers.
This traditional economic efficiency-based argument, however, misses or ignores a crucial fact—namely, that running a
physical commodities business also diversifies the sources and
spectrum of risk to which FHCs become exposed as a result. Let
us imagine, for example, that an accident or explosion on board
an oil tanker owned and operated by one of Morgan Stanley’s
subsidiaries causes a large oil spill in an environmentally fragile area of the ocean. As the shocking news of the disaster
spreads, it may lead Morgan Stanley’s counterparties in the financial markets to worry about the firm’s financial strength
and creditworthiness. Because the full extent of Morgan Stanley’s clean-up costs and legal liabilities would be difficult to estimate upfront, it would be reasonable for the firm’s counter405
parties to seek to reduce their financial exposure to it. In
effect, it could trigger a run on the firm’s assets and bring Morgan Stanley to the verge of liquidity crisis or collapse.
But there is more. What would make this hypothetical oil
spill particularly salient is a shocking revelation that the ultimate owner of the disaster-causing oil tanker was not ExxonMobil or Chevron but Morgan Stanley, a major U.S. banking
organization not commonly associated with the oil business.
That revelation, in and of itself, could create a far broader political controversy that would inevitably invite additional public
scrutiny of the commodity dealings of Goldman, JPMC, and
other Wall Street firms. Thus, in effect, an industrial accident
could potentially cause a major systemic disturbance in the financial markets. These hidden contagion channels make our
current notion of interconnectedness in financial markets seem
rather quaint by comparison. FHCs’ expansion into the oil, gas,
and other physical commodity businesses introduces a whole
new level of interconnections and vulnerabilities into the already fragile financial system.
404. By assuming this role of a “super-intermediary,” financial institutions
effectively—and far more successfully—adopted the business model pioneered
by Enron. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 783, 823–32 (2013).
405. For example, in early 2013, it was estimated that BP’s total losses in
connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident reached at least $90 billion. This sum included not only the direct clean-up and remediation costs but
also various government fines and accumulating legal expenses. Guy Chazan
& Ed Crooks, Claims May Push BP’s Oil Spill Bill to $90bn, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/097ca8f4-6f6b-11e2-b906-00144feab49a
.html#axzz2eEZAEPXd.
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The basic economic efficiency-based argument may also be
overstating the claim that forcing U.S. FHCs out of the physical
commodity and energy business would leave consumers’ needs
in those markets unmet. Traditional commodity trading companies will almost certainly step in to fill any such gap. These
non-bank commodity traders may not be able to offer the same
“fully integrated risk management” services to industrial clients by assuming nearly all financial risk (and logistical headaches) inherent in such clients’ commodity-driven businesses.
That possibility lends some support to the argument for letting
banks act as super-intermediaries, or commodity traders plus.
At the same time, however, it begs the real question as to
why banks are able to out-compete other commodity traders in
this realm, or where that all-important plus comes from. Huge
balance sheets, high credit ratings, and access to plentiful and
relatively cheap financing—these factors enable large banking
organizations to absorb their clients’ commodity-related risks
406
at a lower cost than anyone else could. These unique advantages ultimately stem from the fact that, by taking deposits
and serving as the main channel for the flow of payments and
credit throughout the economy, banks perform a “special” public service and, therefore, enjoy a special public subsidy through
access to federal deposit insurance, special liquidity facilities,
407
and other forms of implicit government guarantees. In this
context, the discussion should focus not on a factual question of
whether banks are in the best position to offer these services
more efficiently, but on a normative question: should banks be
offering them at all?
If banks’ superior ability to provide commodity-related services is rooted in the federal subsidy, the answer to that ques408
tion is not as simple as the efficiency argument assumes. If
taxpayers are the party ultimately conferring this precious eco406. See Meyer, supra note 6 (quoting Blythe Masters).
407. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RES. BANK
MINNEAPOLIS (1983), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm.
408. In June 2012, when Moody’s downgraded JPMC’s credit rating by
three levels, the rating agency was quoted as saying that:
[JPMC] benefited from the assumption that there’s a “very high
likelihood” the U.S. government would back the bank’s bondholders
and creditors if it defaulted on its debt . . . Without the implied federal backing, [JPMC]’s long-term deposit rating would have been three
levels lower and its senior debt would have dropped two more steps.
Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Trading Loss Drove Three-Level Standalone Cut,
BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-22/
jpmorgan-trading-loss-drove-three-level-standalone-cut.html.
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nomic benefit on banks, taxpayers also have the right to stop
banks from abusing that benefit by engaging in risky commer409
cial activities unrelated to their “special” functions.
The
choice of moving into the physical commodities business does
not belong solely to bank executives—the choice ultimately be410
longs to the taxpaying, bank-subsidizing public. If JPMC’s
management wants to be free to make profits by drilling for
and shipping crude oil, it should be able to do so without the estimated $14 billion in annual federal subsidy it receives as a
411
“special” banking institution.
2. Conflicts of Interest, Market Manipulation, and Consumer
Protection
Banks’ extensive involvement in physical commodity activities also raises significant concerns with respect to potential
conflicts of interest and market integrity. One of the key policy
409. Despite the skillfully constructed legal fiction of “complementarity” of
physical commodities trading to derivatives activities, and an even more insidious fiction of derivatives trading as part of the “business of banking,” there is
no inherent connection or relatedness between traditional banking functions
and trading physical barrels of oil.
410. Quantifying this public subsidy, especially in its implicit forms, is an
inherently complex task. A recent academic study estimates that, between
1990 and 2010, large financial institutions received an average funding cost
advantage of approximately 28 basis points per year, reaching a peak of 120
basis points in 2009. That advantage translates into an average total subsidy
of about $20 billion per year, topping $100 billion in 2009. Viral V. Acharya et
al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State
Guarantees 3 (Jan. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961656. To the extent the
study focuses on bond credit spreads and uses on-balance sheet financial data,
however, it may be underestimating the true size of the implicit public subsidy
to large financial institutions.
411. See Editorial, Dear Mr. Dimon, Is Your Bank Getting Corporate Welfare?, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012
-06-18/dear-mr-dimon-is-your-bank-getting-corporate-welfare-.html
(stating
that, according to the IMF research and Bloomberg’s own analysis of bank
balance sheets, JPMC receives a government subsidy worth about $14 billion a
year).
It is worth noting that section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which
imposes quantitative and qualitative limitations on transactions between federally insured depository institutions and their affiliates, should theoretically
prevent the leakage of this public subsidy from banks to their commoditytrading non-bank affiliates. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2012). As the recent crisis
demonstrated, however, the practical effectiveness of this statutory firewall is
subject to considerable doubt. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-LeachBliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1769 (2011).
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reasons for separating banking from commerce is the fear of
banks unfairly restricting their commercial-market competitors’ access to credit, the lifeblood of the economy. Without reliable empirical data, it is difficult to assess the extent to which
this obvious form of conflict of interest currently presents a
problem in the commodities sector. Yet, there is a heightened
danger that banks may use their financial market power to
gain an unfair advantage in commodities markets, and vice
versa.
Goldman’s role in the ongoing aluminum warehousing crisis provides an instructive example. As discussed above, CocaCola complained that Goldman intentionally created a bottleneck at its Metro warehouses in order to drive up market prices
for aluminum and sell their own metal stock at the inflated
price. It is curious, however, that more industrial end-users did
not publicly complain—or complain a lot sooner or louder—
about this potential conflict-of-interest situation. Perhaps, this
artificial aluminum shortage did not hurt their businesses
quite as badly as it did Coca-Cola’s. Or maybe they did not
think that Goldman was so blatantly self-serving. It is also possible that commercial companies deliberately avoided an open
confrontation with Goldman because it was a Wall Street powerhouse with which they had—or hoped to establish—
important credit and financial-advisory relationships. If they
were facing Metro as an independent warehousing operator,
they might have felt less pressure to keep quiet—and to continue paying high aluminum premia. This form of subtle counterparty coercion may be difficult to detect and police but it
raises a legitimate question for further inquiry.
Moreover, metal warehousing operations are only one element in a large financial conglomerate’s complex business
strategy involving trading in metals and related financial contracts. It is no coincidence that Goldman is “one of the largest
412
traders of derivatives in the metals markets.” Unlike an independent warehouse operator, Goldman can potentially use its
storage capabilities not only to generate rental income but also
to move commodity prices in a way that would benefit its derivatives positions. According to a Reuters report, “critics question
whether banks and trade houses who speculate on price should
be allowed to run the warehouses and therefore gain special in412. Jack Farchy, Goldman Sachs Heads of Metals to Retire, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/497280ba-13d0-11e2-8260-00144
feabdc0.html.
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sight into one of the key drivers of price, namely, LME invento413
ries.”
This directly implicates serious issues of market integrity.
As one of the world’s biggest dealers in commodity deriva414
tives, Goldman can devise and execute highly sophisticated
trading strategies across multiple markets. The ability to influence prices of physical assets underlying derivatives, in effect,
completes the circle. It makes Goldman’s derivatives profits not
so much a function of its traders’ superior skills or executives’
talents, but primarily a function of the firm’s structural market
power.
It should be noted here that one of the fundamental drivers
of the value of any derivative is the degree of volatility of the
value of the underlying asset. If the value of the underlying asset is predictably stable, neither hedgers nor speculators would
have any reason to enter into derivative contracts tied to that
value. Conversely, the higher the volatility, the higher the demand for derivatives instruments allowing transfer of the underlying risk. This basic fact reveals the fundamental incentive
for a derivatives dealer with sufficient market power in the underlying physical commodity markets to maintain price volatility in such markets, regardless of the fundamentals of supply
and demand, as the necessary condition of continuing viability
and profitability of its commodity derivatives business.
Market manipulation in commodities markets has long
415
been “a hot button issue.” In contrast to securities markets,
commodities markets are particularly vulnerable to so-called
market power-based manipulation that may not involve fraud
416
or deceptive conduct. A large trader can significantly move
prices of futures and underlying physical commodities not only
by “cornering” the market in a particular product but also by
placing very large sell/buy orders in excess of available liquidi417
ty. This salience of market power in commodities market manipulation underscores the potential dangers of allowing large
financial institutions to dominate both commodity derivatives
413. Maytaal Angel, Storage Play by Glencore, Trafigura Pushes Up Lead
Costs, REUTERS, Sept. 18, 2012, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/
09/18/uk-glencore-lead-idUKBRE88H0L420120918.
414. See Farchy, supra note 412.
415. Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis,
and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2010).
416. Id. at 3–4.
417. Id. at 4.
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markets and the related cash commodity markets.
Finally, artificially high premia for industrial aluminum
translate into higher consumer prices for a wide range of products, from soft drinks to automobiles. Similarly, if JPMC’s
commodity traders did, in fact, inflate wholesale power prices
in California, their manipulative conduct accounts for retail
consumers’ higher electricity bills. Generally, commodity price
inflation is a major component of consumer price inflation. To
the extent that banks’ direct involvement in physical commodity markets distorts traditional supply-and-demand dynamics
and contributes to commodity price volatility, it becomes an
important matter of consumer protection.
An unsustainable rise in consumer prices, driven by the
rising prices of basic commodities, has significant macroeconomic consequences. The recent spikes in nationwide gasoline and heating oil prices illustrate these systemic effects. Despite the general prevalence of traditional supply-and-demand
theories, there is also a legitimate argument that a significant
factor explaining these prices is purely financial speculation in
418
oil. A full discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope
of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that large financial
intermediaries enable and amplify such speculation by creating, marketing, and dealing in commodity-linked financial
products. Indirectly, these intermediaries’ physical commodities operations contribute to speculative bubbles in key commodities, which ultimately increase the cost of living for ordinary Americans. Because rises in the costs of basic goods tend
to disproportionally affect the poor, this artificially-created
price volatility can widen socio-economic disparities that have
tangible and potentially grave consequences for social cohesion
and civil unity. From this perspective, large FHCs’ physical
commodities businesses raise potential concerns not only as a
matter of consumer protection but also as a matter of macroprudential regulation and even political stability.
3. Concentration of Economic and Political Power
Concerns with potential conflicts of interest, market manipulation, and consumer protection are closely connected to
418. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kennedy II, The High Cost of Gambling on Oil,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, at A23; Robert Lenzner, Speculation in Crude Oil
Adds $23.39 to the Price per Barrel, FORBES, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www
.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/02/27/speculation-in-crude-oil-adds-23-39
-to-the-price-per-barrel.
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the broader policy concern with excessive concentration of economic power. That concern looms especially large in the context
of FHCs’ physical commodity trading.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this issue
for the long-term health and vitality of the U.S. economy and of
American democracy. Writing almost a century ago, Justice
Brandeis famously warned against the dangers of combination—or “concentration intensive and comprehensive”—that
gave financial institutions direct control over industrial enter419
prises.
Brandeis saw the “subtle and often long-concealed
concentration of distinct functions, which are beneficient when
separately administered, and dangerous only when combined in
the same persons” as a great threat to economic and political
420
liberties.
The global financial crisis of 2008–09 demonstrated the
continuing salience of Brandeis’s concerns. The taxpayerfunded bailout of large financial conglomerates whose risky activities had contributed to—and, indeed, largely created—the
crisis reignited the century-old debate on the role of “financial
421
oligarchy” in American politics. Not surprisingly, one of the
central themes in post-crisis regulatory reform is the prevention of future bailouts of “too-big-to-fail” financial institu422
tions. The ongoing transformation of large U.S. financial institutions into leading global merchants of physical
commodities and energy, however, significantly complicates the
reformers’ task. By giving banks that are already “too-big-tofail” an additional source of leverage over the economy—and,
consequently, the polity—it elevates the dangers inherent in
cross-sector concentration of economic power to a qualitatively
423
new level. When large financial conglomerates that control
access to money and credit also control access to such universal
production inputs as raw materials and energy, their already
outsized influence on the entire economic—and, by extension,
political—system may reach alarming proportions. For these
reasons, in rethinking the foundational principle of separating
banking and commerce, especially in the context of energy and
419. BRANDEIS, supra note 18, at 4.
420. Id. at 6.
421. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12, 28 (2010); Matt
Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3, 2011, at 44–51.
422. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 421, at 174–80.
423. Id. at 203–05.
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commodity activities, it is critically important to remember
Brandeis’s warnings. Reassessing and reasserting the original
antitrust spirit of U.S. bank holding company regulation may
424
be the necessary first step in the right direction.
4. Beyond the Foundational Myth: Limits of Governability
and Regulatory Capacity
An examination of FHCs’ physical commodity activities also highlights potential problems such activities pose from the
perspective of regulatory design, regulatory process, and firm
governability.
Understanding what exactly large U.S. FHCs own and do
in global commodity markets is the critical first step toward
developing an informed regulatory approach to this issue. Under the current regulatory disclosure system, there is no reliable way to gather and evaluate this information. Existing public disclosure is woefully inadequate to understand and
evaluate the nature and scope of U.S. banking organizations’
physical commodities trading assets and activities. It may not
be feasible or desirable to mandate detailed disclosure of every
commercial activity of a large FHC, but when it comes to energy and other key commodities, what is hidden from the public
425
view may be highly consequential. It is imperative, therefore,
to mandate full public disclosure of financial institutions’ direct
and indirect activities and investments in physical commodities
and energy.
Simply mandating more disclosure, however, will not be
enough. The recent crisis has demonstrated the limits of disclosure as a regulatory tool, especially in the context of complex

424. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 146.
425. The Dodd-Frank Act requires SIFIs to submit to federal regulators
enterprise-wide recovery and resolution plans, or “living wills,” to help their
orderly resolutions in the event of failure. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 165(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1426–27 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365
(2012)). Goldman, Morgan Stanley, JPMC, and other large FHCs have already
submitted their living wills to the Board in July 2012. These documents
should provide an exhaustive description of each institution’s corporate structure and core business activities. They could give regulators the necessary information on these firms’ physical commodity assets and operations. It is not
clear, however, whether this is actually the case, as the bulk of the information in these resolution plans is confidential. None of the publicly available
portions of the living wills filed to date contain any relevant information on
this issue. See Resolution Plans, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (July 2,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm.
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426

markets, institutions, and instruments. Complexity is one of
the fundamental drivers of systemic risk, and managing complexity is one of the key challenges in today’s financial services
427
sector. Large U.S. financial conglomerates are already complex, in terms of their corporate structure, risk management,
and the breadth and depth of financial services and products
they offer. Allowing these firms to run extensive commercial
operations that require specialized technical and managerial
expertise adds to their internal complexity. Firm-wide coordination and monitoring of operations, finances, risks, and legal
and regulatory compliance become all the more difficult in that
context. This is particularly true of capital-intensive, operationally complex, and potentially high-risk physical commodity
activities. An effective integration of these operations may be
further complicated by potential shifts in corporate culture.
Thus, the traditionally aggressive risk-taking culture of commodity traders (think Enron) may push the already questionable ethics of bankers beyond the limits of prudency and legality.
All of these factors present serious challenges for large financial firms’ internal governance and governability.
More importantly, mixing banking with physical commodity trading creates potentially insurmountable challenges from
the perspective of regulatory efficiency and capacity. Direct
linkages, through the common key dealer-banks, between the
vitally important and volatile financial market and the vitally
important and volatile commodity and energy market may amplify the inherent fragility of both markets, as well as the entire economy. Who can effectively regulate and supervise this
new super-market? And how should it be done?
The U.S. system of financial services regulation is already
highly fragmented and ill-suited to detect and reduce systemic
risk across different financial markets and products. The expansion of FHCs’ activities into yet more new areas subject to
extensive regulation under very different regulatory schemes—
environmental regulation, workplace safety regulation, utility
regulation—lays the foundation for jurisdictional conflicts on
an unprecedented scale. In addition to the several federal bank
regulators, the SEC, and CFTC, banking organizations become
subject to regulation by the DOE, the FERC, the Environmen426. See generally Henry Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure Information,’ and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1601 (2012).
427. See generally Saule Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012).
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tal Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Trade Commission,
and possibly other federal and state agencies. Yet, none of these many overseers are likely to see the whole picture, leaving
potentially dangerous gaps in the regulation and supervision of
these systemically important super-intermediaries. An additional complicating factor is the high strategic and geopolitical
significance of energy trading. The flow of oil and gas in global
markets is as much a matter of foreign policy and national security as it is a matter of business. Accordingly, the State Department could also be expected to insist on a say in the affairs
of large U.S. FHCs that import and export oil, gas, and other
428
strategically important commodities.
In terms of substantive regulatory oversight, the situation
is equally discouraging. In addition to being the umbrella regulator for BHCs, the Board is now primarily responsible for pru429
dential regulation and supervision of all SIFIs. As discussed
above, physical commodities activities expose financial institutions to qualitatively different, and potentially catastrophic,
risks. In addition, commodities operations create potential new
430
channels of contagion and systemic risk transmission. Yet the
Board is not equipped to regulate and supervise companies that
own and operate extensive commodity trading assets: oil pipelines, marine vessels, or metal warehouses.
It is not enough to pay lip service to these concerns by
simply requiring FHCs to conduct their commercial activities in
compliance with the applicable securities, commodities, energy,
431
and other laws and regulations. Those regulatory schemes
are not designed with SIFIs in mind and, therefore, do not address the unique risks—enterprise-wide and systemic—posed

428. One could argue that the State Department might like the idea of big
U.S. banks as major players in the global energy markets. These banks may
serve as potential sources of vital economic intelligence and levers of increasing American influence in notoriously opaque and strategically important oil
and gas markets. It is far from clear, however, how effective the State Department can be in harnessing big private banks’ market power to serve the
country’s strategic objectives, especially if such objectives conflict with the
Board’s prudential oversight goals. Introducing this element into the mix of
policies governing the U.S. financial institutions is likely to make the existing
system of financial services regulation even more complicated and less effective.
429. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 113, 165, 124 Stat. at 1398–1402, 1423–32 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323, 5364–5365).
430. See supra Part IV.B.1.
431. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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432

by their activities. Realistically, however, the Board has little
choice but rely on FHCs’ promises to comply with such parallel
regulatory regimes. Without the necessary expertise and a
clear legal mandate, neither the Board nor any other financial
regulator can be expected to exercise meaningful oversight of
large financial institutions’ commodity businesses and the risks
they generate. This natural limit on regulatory capacity is an
important reason for serious reconsideration of FHCs’ role in
physical commodities markets.
C. BEYOND BANKING: PUSHING CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL
BOUNDARIES
This Article has focused upon U.S. FHCs’ involvement in
physical commodities trading and related commercial activities.
In recent decades, however, the intertwined processes of bank
disintermediation, functional convergence of financial products,
and consolidation of the financial services industry have significantly reduced sector-specific differences among large financial
intermediaries. By subjecting all SIFIs to enhanced prudential
oversight and orderly resolution requirements typically applied
to depository institutions, the Dodd-Frank Act, in effect,
acknowledged the fact that systemic risk can be created and
transmitted not only by commercial banks and their affiliates
but also by investment banks, insurance firms, and other regulated and unregulated financial market participants.
Against this broader institutional backdrop, the analysis
presented in this Article raises two additional issues of considerable practical and theoretical significance.
The first question is this: if it is socially desirable to prevent banks from conducting commercial activities in physical
commodities, is it also not desirable—and even necessary—to
apply the same rule to all large, systemically significant financial institutions? The same public policy concerns that arise
with respect to banking organizations’ commodity trading—
heightened potential for conflicts of interest and market manipulation, an excessive concentration of market power, increased systemic risk from direct linkages between financial
432. Generally, these specialized regulatory regimes pursue policy goals
fundamentally different from the goals of prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions. See generally David B. Spence & Robert Prentice,
The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market
Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131 (2012) (describing regulation of U.S. oil, gas, and
electricity markets).

2013]

MERCHANTS OF WALL STREET

355

markets and economically vital commodities markets, and lessened governability of financial institutions—are equally applicable to similar activities conducted by non-bank SIFIs. Therefore, as a matter of both theoretical consistency and practical
efficacy, there is a strong argument for extending the old principle of separation of banking and commerce beyond the banking sector, at least with respect to physical commodities and
energy activities.
The second theoretical question stems from the fact that
financial institutions’ growing involvement in the physical
commodities and energy trade pushes the boundaries of the
fundamental concept of financial intermediation itself. What
are the core functions of financial intermediaries in modern
economy? How far are we willing to stretch the definition of financial—as opposed to trade—intermediation as a distinct
form of service-based economic activity? The blurring of these
boundaries in practice inevitably creates conceptual ambiguity,
which in turn may lead to confused and ineffective policy choices and legal doctrines. An empirical analysis of large financial
institutions’ physical commodity activities provides an opportunity to revisit these foundational concepts as the basis for potentially reconfiguring the entire system of financial services
regulation. This, however, is a subject for future inquiry.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the legal, regulatory, policy, and
theoretical aspects of an ongoing transformation of large U.S.
banking organizations into global merchants of physical commodities and energy. In the absence of detailed and reliable information, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions as to the
social efficiency and desirability of allowing this transformation
to continue. What we can already ascertain about U.S. financial
institutions’ physical commodity assets and activities, however,
raises potentially serious public policy concerns that must be
addressed through a fully-informed public deliberation. Even if
big U.S. FHCs were, in fact, to scale down their physical commodity operations either in response to current regulatory developments or as a temporary market adjustment, it would not
obviate the need for such deliberation. Addressing these policy
concerns in a timely, open, and publicly minded manner remains a task of the utmost importance, both as an economic
matter and as a matter of democratic governance.

